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ABSTRACT
This study conducted a critical review of professional
development requirements in the Surface Warfare Community to
maximize the use of increasingly scarce permanent change of
station (PCS) funds. Seven network representations of
career pathways were constructed to encapsulate the career
paths Surface Warfare Officers (SWOs) actually pursue. Four
focal points of professional development were determined to
provide the basis for these pathways . These four are the
major command tour, the commander command tour, the execu-
tive officer tour and the department head tour. Naval
Officer Billet File data and information from the Naval
Military Personnel Command's Officer Manning Plan model were
used to determine the geographic locations and respective
numbers of SWO billets. Officer Longitudinal Master File
data were used to determine historical tour lengths of
Surface Warfare Officers . Analyses were conducted for key
developmental tours and for the type of tour assignment (sea
or shore, and geographic location). The interrelationships
between tour length, billet opportunity and selectivity are
discussed. The above considered, two additional career
pathways were developed which improve the efficiency of the
SWO career path and potentially save PCS funds.
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In commenting on the Department of Defense personnel
budget request for Fiscal Year 1985, the Chairman of t~he
House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee stated:
Permanent Change of Station travel is a recurring
concern of this Committee. From fiscal year 1983 to
fiscal year 1984 for only a 1.8 percent overall increase
in Defense end strengths , there was a 3 percent increase
in PCS moves and a lb percent increase in PCS funding.
Annually since 1973, Congress has been asking more and
tougher questions about DoD ' s management of the PCS budget
which comprises approximately eight percent of the mili-
tary's total personnel budget. One of their primary
concerns is with tour lengths and their perception that
officers are moved too frequently. The services contend
that the essence of proper career development requires the
progression of an officer through a sequence of challenging
assignments or billets developing an officer's managerial
and warfare competence [Ref. 1]
.
A vital component of the Navy's professional development
concept which differs from the other services is sea-shore
rotation. Since naval officers are required to serve at
sea, transfers ashore at periodic intervals are necessary to
retain quality personnel and share with the shore establish-
ment expertise gained at sea. A large portion of the
requirement to serve at sea belongs to the Surface Warfare
Officer. The Unrestricted Line Officer Career Planning




The Surface Warfare Community is composed of officers
who are qualified in the surface warfare specialty, who
man the surface ships of the Navy and whose goal is to
command those ships. The Surface Warfare Officer (SWO)
must, through a progression of competitive assignments,
learn the fundamentals of engineering, weapons systems,
and operational tactics [Ref. 2: p. 23].
The key point to note is that the Surface Warfare
Officer is a sea-going warfare specialist, who in order to
develop and hone his tactical and warfighting skills must
serve at sea; that is what he is trained for and is his
raison d'etre. For only in wartime will his skills and
professional development be put to the ultimate test.
Unmentioned above, but important nonetheless, are the shore
assignments filled by the Surface Warfare Community. Here
jobs in fields as varied as recruiting, midshipman training,
postgraduate education, ship repair and overhaul, communica-
tions, logistics support, weapons systems design and finan-
cial management make up those areas where today's hard work
contribute to both current and future readiness. The
purpose of these jobs ashore is to support the fleet and to
contribute to and aid in optimizing battle readiness. The
sine qua non of the SWO personnel management system is to
develop high-quality, experienced personnel capable of
performing in current billets to ensure maximum readiness
and preparing to excel in future billets. These personnel
must be developed within the Navy structure. The means to
achieve this end is the SWO career path, depicted in Figure
1.1.
Like any large organization, the structure of the
officer corps of the Navy forms a pyramid which rises
from a broad base of junior officers, through a rela-
tively few flag officers to the Chief of Naval
Operations. If there is to be a realistic flow of
promotion up this pyramid, all who enter at the bottom
cannot reach the top. Each officer does, however, have
the same promotion opportunity as his/her contemporaries


















































































Figure 1.1 Surface Warfare Officer Career Path
This pyramidal structure is supplied by a closed
personnel system with entry at the bottom and lateral trans-
it
fers into the system virtually non-existent. This requires
the Navy's manpower system to be a "grow-our- own" corps of
knowledgeable and professionally competent Naval officers to
meet demands both current and future. Because inventory
gains to meet requirements must ultimately be achieved
through accessions to the bottom grade, a systematic,
professional development of individual officers within the
community is essential.
The perceived pinnacle of professional accomplishment,
and goal of every Surface Warfare Officer, is command at
sea. It is towards this end that the SWO career path has
evolved. The basic career path has the following
constraints considered inviolable:
1. the critical developmental sea tours are: division
officer, department head, executive officer and
commanding officer in that order;
2. the community cannot access more officers than it has
bunks and billets for at sea;
3. the division officer tour must be preceded by the SWO
(Basic) course of instruction;
4. completion of Department Head School is required
before serving the initial Department Head tour, a
list of these billets is included in Appendix B;
5. the total length of consecutive sea tours should not
exceed three years (otherwise retention may
decrease)
;
6. officers must have completed the critical develop-
mental tours, and have significant fitness reports
from them, prior to the convening of their selection
board to the next pay grade.
The wisdom of these constraints has been borne out histori-
cally. Where competition is intense, successful tour
completion speaks loudly and lack of a meaningful fitness
report covering one of these critical tours works to an
officer's detriment.
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With this in mind, the assignment branch makes every
effort to ensure that LTs have completed one department head
tour; LCDRs have completed their executive officer tour; and
that CDRs have completed their Commander Command tour.
These constraints work two ways. In addition to determining
how late an officer may commence a tour, it also determines
how early a tour may start. The goal here is that officers
are assigned to these critical jobs based on seniority
first
.
Official guidance concerning tour length policy is found
in Military Personnel Assignments (DoD Instruction 1315.7),
the Officer Transfer Manual (NAVPERS 15559) and the Officer
Distribution Manual (NMPC Instruction 5400. 1G). The latter
states
:
Officer tour lengths are established taking into consid-
eration Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy,
the needs of the service, professional career develop-
ment and, where feasible, the desires of the individual.
Other important factors taken into consideration are
personnel inventory, number of ships/ commands available
or projected, future requirements, etc. These factors
must be weighed, within fiscal constraints, to provide
career patterns which develop the leadership and exper-
tise required of officers in all sectors of our Navy
[Ref. 3: p. 4-1].
B. EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT
There is consensus in the literature that the benefits
of relocation and transfer are that personnel receive a
broader experience base and are more aware of their organi-
zation's operations as a whole. It also permits an indi-
vidual to be assigned where he is most useful. This dual
purpose of training and management development is the core
of executive development.
16
1 . Civilian Executive Development
While the Navy with its sea-shore rotation policy
and planned rotation system differs significantly from
private enterprise, the goal for both is executive develop-
ment. Arima [Ref. 4] found that civilian organizations
today tend not to move their employees without a specific
requirement . This finding was supported by Government
Accounting Office research [Ref. 5] which determined that
multi-national corporations generally reassign their execu-
tives only in response to specific requirements. It also
reported that these corporations make extensive use of
foreign nationals to fill their overseas positions.
Mahler [Ref. 6] offers that many developmental
actions can't be accomplished unless begun early in an indi-
vidual's career. He states that although a professional
development program does not guarantee results, the lack of
one will seriously threaten successful results. Peter
Drucker, the dean of early management science, cautions that
the worst thing an organization can do is to try and develop
the hard- chargers and ignore the others. He warns that "10
years from now 80% of the work will be done by those left
out" [Ref. 6: p. 162] .
Never transferring employees may yield adverse
effects. Pinder [Ref. 7] reports that so doing will not
meet valid staffing needs or properly train employees. Hall
and Hall [Ref. 8] are in concurrence, speculating that in
the long run no movement leads to highly- trained and
specialized personnel and with them obsolescence.
In the past many civilian companies expected their
employees to transfer frequently; this was especially true
in the 60 's and early 70' s. Since then, as costs and
employee reluctance to move have increased, most major
corporations have decreased their number of employee
17
transfers. Moves now are being made only when both present
staffing needs and future development needs can be met
simultaneously [Ref. 9].
No concrete evidence has been found to identify the
optimal length of time a job should be held. Pinder
[Ref. 7] found a shortage of research on the part of organi-
zational behavior specialists into the transfer effects on
both the people and the organizations involved. Little
documentation was found concerning organizational effective-
ness and the impact of transfer policies. In an attempt to
define the optimal length of time a job should be held,
Business Week [Ref. 10] stated that the first job assignment
should be two to five years long unless experience was being
gained in different functional areas. The article went on
to conclude that subsequent job lengths should fall into the
three to four year range. Taylor's findings [Ref. 11] that
the average American labor force members change jobs every
three to five years, seems to support this, as does the GAO
study [Ref. 5] which determined that large corporations
estimated the most desirable tenure in an assignment to be
about four years. Hauser's findings [Ref. 12]. of a four
and a half year tenure for the average corporate manager
also support this
.
2 . Naval Officer Executive Development
The basic philosophy of job rotation and relocation
in the military is to fulfill world-wide staffing require-
ments and provide for training and professional development.
Markov Mikas [Ref. 13]. found that, not surprisingly, mili-
tary personnel have more frequent changes of jobs than do
civilians. Hauser stated "the typical Naval officer is
seldom in a position long enough to master it" [Ref. 12: p.
461], He went on to conclude:
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In business, there is concentration on productivity .
. rotating individual managers through various positions
to enhance their potential for promotion would be
considered counter-productive, even frivolous.
there is nothing in any known U.S. firm to compare with
the services' propensity to give every officer with
promotion potential a "staff and line" rotation in each
frade from 0-1 to 0-8 in the course of 30 years
Ref . 12: p. 459]
.
Rezin [Ref. 14] agrees, stating that due to the Navy's
frequent rotation policy, an officer does not have suffi-
cient time to become proficient in a job before he is trans-
ferred. He also found this policy expensive, incurring
additional training, lost time, and family hardship costs
along with the accountable PCS costs.
The true value of longer tours may best be expressed
by the current Vice Chief of Naval Operations. In a hand-
written comment on a CNO Memorandum to increase CO tour
lengths, Admiral Hayes wrote: "Higher readiness will accrue
by having people in jobs longer who know what to do, i.e. a
6 month extension may double the time in command of someone
who knows his job." The application of this principle would
do much to reduce PCS moves and thus costs.
C. OBJECTIVES
This thesis represents an attempt to examine and analyze
the Surface Warfare Officer career path to assess the feasi-
bility of altering it to decrease the number or frequency of
moves or both. The research methodology will initially
center around investigations on two fronts. The first major
step will be a determination of the experiences deemed
necessary to enable officers to perform adequately in future
billets. Specific tour types and lengths will be explored
to provide additional information concerning training and/or
education essential to these tours.
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Once the number and frequency of vacancies have been
determined to accommodate the required officer professional
development, actual SWO movement patterns will be examined.
This determination of historical, average tour lengths will
be by tour type and pay grade. Subsequent to this, a
comparison of the historical officer movement pattern with
the minimum moves required for professional development will
be carried out. The attempt here will be to account for and
analyze the differences
.
When completed, this thesis will have evaluated the
current surface warfare officer career path to determine if
a decreased frequency of moves and/or an increased effi-
ciency of officer rotations will still provide the required
professional development. If a change in tour length or
alteration of the SWO career path is deemed warranted, it
will be recommended.
The specific objectives of this research are to:
1. Examine the validity of the current Surface Warfare
Officer career path by
a) establishing career developmental focal points;
b) incorporating SWO career path constraints; and
c) reviewing the desired assignment selectivity (tour
opportunity) at each successive tour leading to
those focal points.
2. Determine the geographical locations of the billets,
both afloat and ashore, a Surface Warfare Officer
would be expected to fill in accordance with the
career path.
3. Examine the feasibility of linking successive tours
together to minimize geographical relocation, thereby
reducing PCS costs.
4. Utilizing this geographical billet information,
establish a methodology to assess the effects of tour




5. Recommend improvements to the SWO career path which
will enhance professional development, holding PCS
costs constant, or reduce PCS costs maintaining the
same level of SWO professionalism.
21
II. PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION MOVES
A . BACKGROUND
The extensive rotation of Navy Surface Warfare Officers
among various job assignments is a by-product of the Navy's
need to meet manpower requirements and personnel management
objectives. The need for rotation arises because the Navy
is composed of several hundred ships and thousands of shore
stations spread throughout the world. The first step in a
discussion of Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves is to
define the term and introduce the six categories of PCS
moves
.
A PCS move is defined as the transfer of a member from
one permanent duty station to another permanent duty station
(for duty of more than six months or instruction of twenty
weeks or more). The categories of PCS moves are described
in Table 1. Of note, but peripheral to the subject of PCS
cost control, are the numerous entitlements covered by a PCS
move. These are itemized in Appendix C.
The majority of PCS moves are involved with accessing
people into the Armed Forces, later separating them from
military service or rotating them to or from overseas
billets. In FY 1983, almost 84 percent of PCS moves and 83
percent of their costs were associated with accession, sepa-
ration or overseas (rotational) moves. The number of acces-
sion and separation moves are not affected by rotation
policy. In a 5 January 1983 letter to the Chairman of the
House Armed Services Committee, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics






ACCESSION MOVE: Movement from home or place of
acceptance of commission to first permanent duty
station.
SEPARATION MOVE: Movement from the last permanent
y station (regardL
record (or selection)
dut less of location) to home of
:l
ORGANIZED UNIT MOVE: Movement resulting from a
change of homeport /homeyard of a ship or staff mobile
unit or from the relocation of a shore based activity
ROTATIONAL MOVE: Movement between permanent duty
stations involving transoceanic travel when neither
duty station involves an assignment to duty of more
than 6 months or under instruction of 20 weeks or
more. This includes all transoceanic travel
regardless of training involvement.
TRAINING MOVE: Movement to or from a training
assignment of 20 weeks or more duration at one
activity that does not involve transoceanic travel.
OPERATIONAL MOVE: Movement between permanent duty
stations not involving transoceanic travel when
neither duty station involves 'an assignment to duty
less than 6 months or duty under instruction of 20
weeks or more.
The number of rotational moves is a direct function of
Brogrammed overseas strength levels and tour lengths,
verseas strength levels are established based on mili-
tary and political considerations. Tour lengths for
each overseas location are prescribed by Department of
Defense Directive based on the characteristics of each
location and on whether or not a member is accompanied
by dependents. Prescribed tour lengths at relatively
desirable locations are 36-48 months when accompanied by
dependents and 18-24 months when without dependents.
Tour lengths at less desirable locations are necessarily
shorter. However, when the conditions change at these
less desirable locations, such as an upgrade or expan-
sion of facilities, the tour is lengthened. The objec-
tive is for all personnel assigned overseas to complete
the prescribed duty tour for the location in which they
are assigned [Ref. 15: p. 1]
.
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B. PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION STUDIES
To evaluate the magnitude of the Navy's problem with
respect to PCS moves several studies have been conducted.
Discussed in a Naval Personnel Research and Development
Center PCS factsheet was a 1982 study reviewing retours
(subsequent assignments in the same geographical location)
that found Navy retour rates were 18 percent in FY 1980 and
32 percent in FY 1981. That study concluded that the Navy's
billet structure limited the ability to expand the use of
retours. A later survey, again discussed in the NPRDC
factsheet, reviewed FY 1983 results and found that in areas
of large fleet concentrations the retour rates were signifi-
cantly higher, namely 50 percent in both San Diego and
Norfolk. Like its predecessor this study too determined
that the Navy was operating near its capacity to retour.
In March 1983 a DoD PCS Policy Planning Group with four
service participation was established to review PCS-related
policy for possible savings and increased effectiveness. It
discovered that the Navy had the lowest rate of OPS/ROT
moves of all the services and also the greatest annualized
decrease (2.8%) over six years [Ref. 16: p. 20].
One of the reasons for this may be recent Navy initia-
tives to reduce PCS moves. Included among these has been
the active solicitation of tour extensions by the Naval
Military Personnel Command and the SWO split-tour policy
which has limited moves of department heads to follow-on
department head tours on the same coast and even same home-
port in about 65 percent of the cases. Also included was
the reduction of all pipeline training enroute to sea duty
assignments by approximately one-third. To accomplish this
all of the professional development training courses were
streamlined in length. These included the SWO (Basic)
course, Department Head School and the Prospective Executive
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Officer course. This savings in SWO man-years alone
amounted to an. annual officer inventory gain of forty five
and a half.
Efforts such as these have led the GAO to state to
Congress that "In view of the attention the Department of
Defense has given PCS issues, often at the prompting of the
Congress, there may be limited opportunities for further
major funding reductions" [Ref. 17: p. 1] . Although this
may be the case, the Navy is continuing to review its PCS
management efforts to ensure that maximum efficiency and
dollar effectiveness are attained.
It is significant to note that reduction of PCS moves
has been primarily for budgetary reasons. As efforts to cut
the burgeoning national budget deficit intensify, it will be
important to avoid the establishment of detailed, restric-
tive DoD PCS policies. If the budgetary problem is resolved
by PCS funds cuts made in a vacuum, "the policies involved
may result in less than optimum solutions considering all
goals and objectives" [Ref. 18: p. 10,11].
C. CONTROLLABILITY OF MOVES
A critical aspect in the discussion of PCS funds is the
actual controllability of the number of moves and hence the
costs of moves in each category. Of the six categories of
moves discussed in Table 1, three are considered distribu-
tion policy-driven moves and are controllable. The three
remaining types of moves are considered mandatory moves and
are considered uncontrollable.
The three controllable move categories are operational,
rotational and training. All three are based on tour
lengths specified as part of the SWO career path. These
tour lengths determine the flow rate of officers through
billets and billet opportunity. The three mandatory move
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categories are accession, separation and organized unit
moves. Accession moves are made in response to projected
separation moves and to support the programmed growth in
officer end strength. Unit moves in the Navy are largely
due to ship overhauls or to geographical realignment of
fleet structure for readiness purposes. Due to their
uncontrollability , accession, separation and unit moves will
not be included in this study.
D. SWO PCS MOVE DATA
Surface Warfare officer PCS data for the four years
ending with FY 1984 were obtained from the Fiscal Management
Branch (NMPC 463) of the Naval Military Personnel Command.
These are displayed in Table 2. Based on this data average
PCS costs by type of move are:
1. Operational -- $2718.
2. Rotational -- $7883.
3. Training -- $3038.
TABLE 2
Surface Officer Move and Cost Data















The overall average move cost is $3488. These figures may
be used if corrected for inflation to compute the cost
impact of a tour length change.
E. REQUIREMENTS VERSUS PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The use officer rotation originates from two principal
concerns: filling manpower requirements and providing for
professional development. While the two are inextricably
related, the Officer Transfer Manual states that
"Manpower-personnel policies pertaining to the officer
corps, are driven by requirements." This is as it should
be, professional development is the means by which officers
are trained and gain experience to fill the needs of the
Navy expressed through the approved officer billet file.
This study assumes this billet file is valid.
The following chapter will look at professional develop-
ment in the SWO community and the attendant issues involved.
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III. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Before assessing the efficiency of the Surface Warfare
Officer career path, it is important to understand the basic
nature of the path and the major professional milestones
inherent in it. This will serve as a prelude to a discus-
sion of the Operational Technical Managerial System (OTMS)
Guidelines and its growing importance to the Navy and to
individual careers with respect to subspecialty development
and utilization.
A. THE SWO CAREER PATH
The essence of a SWO Career is a measured progression
through a series of training, experience and application
tours "...with command at sea or ashore, as the ultimate
goal" [Ref. 2: p. vii] . The foundation of today's SWO
community is in the programmed development of its junior
officers
.
All officers who enter the Surface community do so via a
sixteen and a half week intensive course of instruction
taught either in Newport, Rhode Island or Coronado,
California. This course covers a wide range of professional
areas designed to provide the new officer with the basic
tools and knowledge for a division officer assignment at
sea. If the officer's prospective billet requires it, he
will also undergo additional functional training designed
for several of the more technical shipboard billets while
enroute to the ship.
The knowledge and qualifications expected during the
initial shipboard tour are demanding. During this thirty
month tour an officer should prove himself a competent
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division officer and qualify as a Combat Information Center
Watch Officer (or Surface Watch Officer) , underway Officer
of the Deck (OOD(U/W)) and finally, as a Surface Warfare
Officer. If assigned to the engineering department the
earning of his Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW) qual-
ification will precede the others. Since this qualification
will be a prerequisite when screening for executive officer
afloat, an engineering assignment during the initial sea
tour is the ideal time to accomplish this.
During the first sea tour all surface warfare trainees
should serve in at least two departments. This rotation
will provide junior SWOs with a broader experience base. By
so doing two-thirds of the officers should hold at least one
job in the engineering department which includes formal EOOW
school and an increased opportunity to qualify as an EOOW.
Providing this broadened experience base at this early
career stage will be the least costly in terms of readiness.
Once the first critical career milestone of SWO qualifi-
cation has been accomplished, the second major milestone is
addressed. Semi-annually the records of junior Surface
Warfare Officers with at least thirty months commissioned
service are reviewed by a formal administrative screening
board to select the best qualified by reason of prior
performance and potential for attendance at the Surface
Warfare Department Head Course and ultimately assignment to
a surface ship as head of a major department. An important
aspect of the department head screening process is to desig-
nate those selected to enter operations, engineering or
combat systems tracks. This track selection which is based
on individual preference, demonstrated proficiency,
commanding officer's recommendation and the needs of the
Navy will identify the department in which that officer will
serve as department head.
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Approximately one-third of each year group will be
assigned a follow-on 18-month sea tour after the initial
tour. These LTJG or LT sub-department head billets, such as
precommissioning crew or the Carrier Readiness Improvement
Program (CVRIP), require SWO-qualified proven performers as
explained above. These tours will further broaden a young
officer's experience and knowledge of a different ship.
Upon completion of an officer's initial sea tour(s) an
officer will normally be ordered ashore for approximately
two years. This assignment could be for graduate education,
recruiting, instructing others or a host of other jobs in
Washington, D.C., the rest of the continental United States
or in one of the more than seventy foreign countries where
the Surface community fills billets.
Following completion of this first shore assignment an
officer will be ordered to Newport, Rhode Island for the 24
and a half week Department Head Course. Upon course comple-
tion, officers will return to sea for a three-year period,
serving two 18-month tours (hence the term split-tour) in
the same departmental area. These tours will be served in
different ships but will use experience gained as a Division
Officer and build on the material learned in the Department
Head Course. The progression of the two department head
billets will be from less to more complex and will provide
"increased experience in a discipline ... through continuity
of assignments" [Ref. 19]. This is an essential feature of
the current SWO career path, to use and build on previous
expertise. It is a significant break from the
"Jack-of -all- trades" mentality that most SWOs grew up with.
The URL Officer Career Guidebook amplifies the purpose of
the two department head tours being served in two different
ship types quite succinctly [Ref. 2: p. 27].
This split tour concept is designed to service two
career objectives: broaden your professional knowledge
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within your own warfare community and make available to
all Surface Warfare Officers a level of diverse fleet
expertise which is unavailable through
tt
any other source.
It also serves the "needs of the Navy" by ensuring that
all types of surface ships receive the highest possible
level of competence in the department head billets.
The listing of both first and second half split-tour depart-
ment head billets is shown in Appendix B.
An officer's second shore tour will begin at the nine or
ten year point of commissioned service. If an officer
completed postgraduate education, utilization of this educa-
tion in his subspecialty is a primary consideration. For
others the opportunity still exists if qualified to attend
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPGS). Other options include
attendance at a junior service college, if previously
selected, or again a host of other billets in Washington,
D.C., the rest of the continental United States (CONUS), or
outside the continental US (OUTUS).
Following the second shore tour most Lieutenant
Commanders can expect to spend about three years at sea in
two distinct 18-month tours. In one of these tours called a
LCDR complex Sea Tour, a SWO will further utilize his
departmental technical expertise as a department head on a
major ship or on a major staff. Assignment as an afloat
executive officer (XO), the other LCDR tour, is strictly
dependent on having successfully screened for this demanding
job and is the third major career milestone for a Surface
Warfare Officer. Formal administrative screening for this
assignment is conducted yearly with each promotional year
group having four annual "looks" (five if serving in an
afloat billet at the time). With current XO selection
opportunity about 60 percent, the surface XO screening board
will select one-third of a year group's executive officers
from each of the three departmental disciplines, namely
Operations, Combat Systems and Engineering.
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The training conducted just prior to the XO tour
consists of two separate courses. Opposite training is the
first and is designed to refamiliarize and update an officer
with those departmental areas where he did not serve a
department head tour (e.g. engineering training for a former
Combat Systems Officer) . The other course is the
Prospective Executive Officer (PXO) course which will
broaden the PXO ' s knowledge of all departments and in addi-
tion to specialized tactical training will prepare him to be
"second in command."
During the third and subsequent shore tours assignments
will be made to increasingly more challenging billets of
responsibility where officers may further apply their skills
and experiences in subspecialty billets, operational billets
requiring SWOs
,
general unrestricted line officer billets or
senior service colleges. An increasing number of these
billets are in the Washington, D.C. area but a significant
number also exists in other CONUS areas and some in OUTUS
areas
.
The commanding officer (CO) tour in the grade of
commander follows, as the professional apex for a mid-grade
officer. Screening for this challenging assignment is the
fourth major milestone for the Surface Warfare Officer.
Selection for command begins in the year following selection
to rank of CDR and is conducted by a formal administrative
screening board. This annual procedure reviews those
already chosen for continued outstanding performance and
gives each promotional year group four "looks". For those
officers not screened, utilization of expertise, especially
as a proven subspecialist is highly sought after. Those
selected for command will serve a twenty-seven month CO tour
and approximately thirty percent of these may expect a
follow-on Post-CO tour at sea. The achievement of selection
to the grade of captain is the fifth major SWO milestone.
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Of those junior captains having had command, approximately
forty percent will be screened for a major command (about
twenty-seven percent at sea and thirteen percent ashore).
Those selected are specifically screened for command- at- sea
either of a ship or a staff; CO of a major Naval activity
ashore; or as a program manager ashore. The tour lengths
for these billets are twenty-four months (eighteen months
minimum on a ship, as the first half of a sequential
command); thirty-six months; and forty-eight months respec-
tively. Roughly half of those serving major command tours
will be screened for a follow-on sequential command.
Of critical importance to the success of the SWO career
path in meeting the future needs of the Navy is the reten-
tion of quality, well-trained officers.
The retention of officers is of great importance to the
Navy because of the lengthy time, effort, and money that
are required to qualify individuals to perform in crit-
ical warfare functions. In addition, retention of offi-
cers is required to permit selectivity of choice for
promotions, specialized training and education, and key
assignments. [Ref. 4: p. 6].
Billets in the Navy must be filled with the best available
officers. If retention is poor and there are insufficient
qualified officers to relieve those in valid billets at' sea,
then the alternatives are to extend the incumbents by
lengthening their tours until a qualified relief can be
found or lowering the quality requirements for the job.
Extending personnel at sea can be expected to have a delet-
erious effect on retention, further exacerbating the officer
inventory and quality issue. Lowering quality will at some
point have a negative effect on fleet and combat readiness.
In 1980 a policy decision change was implemented altering
the initial three year sea tour to a junior officer (JO)
"split tour" plan. Here, following a two year sea tour, JOs
were transferred to another ship type for a follow-on,
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18-month sea tour to expand their professional experience.
Investigating the effects of the policy change, Cook and
Morrison (Cook and Morrison) found that officers receiving a
split-tour were more likely to resign than those who had not
split- tour
.
This explanation of the basic Surface Warfare Career
Path was intended to illustrate a path which is develop-
mental, building on and utilizing previous experience. It
also shows quite visibly the sea/shore rotation whose impor-
tance is often overlooked when considering the officer
communities and the SWO community in particular.
B. OTMS - THE OPERATIONAL TECHNICAL MANAGERIAL SYSTEM
OTMS is the personnel management system for the
Unrestricted Line Officer recognizing operational develop-
ment as the cornerstone of a career, yet emphasizing concen-
trated development of a secondary technical or managerial
field to meet total Navy requirements [Ref. 2]. Within this
system operational tours are stressed developing warfare
specialization and each subsequent operational tour builds
on the previous one. As an officer advances up the rank
structure, the level of technical and managerial challenges
and responsibilities will require a solid background devel-
oped during previous non-operational tours. The
Unrestricted Line Officer Career Planning Guidebook
cautions, however, against building this subspecialty exper-
tise at the expense of operational development: "It is
important to understand that for the URL officer development
in a subspecialty is not a generally available alternative
to operational development" [Ref. 2: p. 7]. What is needed
in the SWO community today are officers who are both proven
warfare specialists operationally and proven subspecialist
s
ashore. For, in choosing those "best fitted" for positions
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of greater responsibility in the Navy, selection boards have
recognized
the URL officers who have specialized expertise and
?roven performance in areas other than their operational
ields. An examination of the selection board statis-
tics reveals that officers who are both outstanding
performers in their designator specialty and a proven
subspecialist enjoy an extremely high promotion
opportunity [Ref. z: p. 7].
Evidence of this fact are the FY 1981 - 1985 averages for
promotion to captain shown in Table 3. An officer's chance
of promotion to captain with both command experience and a
proven subspecialty is almost 27% higher than an officer who
has had command experience only, and is a full 67% higher
than one having only a proven subspecialty.
TABLE 3
Five Year Average of Promotion Probability to Captain
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The opportunity for command, or for any other sea tour
is determined by three factors
:
1. the number of ships available;
2. the size of each year group; and
3. the length of the tour.
Since within a given period of time, the number of ships
available and the size of a year group are fixed, tour
length is the only variable that can be altered. Tour
length is critical because it determines the frequency with
which a given number of billets will turnover; the shorter
the tour length, the more rapid the turnover and the greater
the officer flow through a billet, otherwise known as the
billet rate. This rate or flow expressed in people per year
represents that portion of a year group having the opportu-
nity to perform in that billet.
A recent example illustrating the effect of lengthening
tours and the resultant decrease in opportunity was the
CNO ' s decision to lengthen Surface Warfare Commander Command
tours from 24 to 27 months. This three month extension
resulted in this command opportunity to decrease from 50% to
45%. The net result was that approximately five fewer offi-
cers in those year groups affected would have the opportu-
nity to serve in an afloat command. The formula to
determine command opportunity and a sample determination of
it is given in Table 4.
The career path previously displayed in Figure 1.1, was
implemented in December 1983. While most of this new
pathway has already been implemented, some of the training
involved will not be in place until 1987 due to personnel
and facility construction constraints. The rationale for
implementation of this change was the perception by many
senior Surface Warfare flag officers that insufficient
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TABLE IV
Surface Commander Command Opportunity
for n Number of YGs
AVERAGE YG STRENGTH =











59 186 x 57% 106
60 191 x 57% 109
61 206 x 57% 117
62 249 x 57% 142
63 171 x 57% 97
YG Total 1003
effort was being made to develop and utilize the specialists
required to operate and maintain the increasingly complex
engineering and combat systems found in the fleet.
The major objectives of this revised SWO career path as
stated in [Ref. 20: p. 1] are to:
1. increase readiness and warfighting capability;
2. intensify officer professional development in opera-
tions, combat systems, engineering, and overall
material readiness
;
3. provide the CO more opportunity to concentrate on
tactics and warfighting;
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4. provide broad base of experience to division officers
through increased rotation;
5. provide increased experience in a discipline to
department heads through continuity of assignments;
and
6. provide department head assignment progression from
less to more complex responsibilities in the same
area.
A complete list of the revised career path objectives are
included in Appendix D.
VADM Walters, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Surface Warfare echoed these objectives, emphasizing "our
primary objective is to increase the technical competence
and professionalism of our mid-grade officers" [Ref. 20: p.
1] . On another occasion he stated "we need to leave mid-
grade SWOs in a technical discipline where they have prior
experience, a good bit longer ... as experience and knowl-
edge deepen so do competence and efficiency increase in the
billet" [Ref. 21: p. 2]
.
In summary, the evolution of the SWO Path is based on
four focal points of development. These are:
1. the Department Head tour,
2. the Executive Officer tour,
3. the Commander Command tour,
4. the Major Command tour.
Selection for each of these focal points is reached
following administrative board screening of one's service
record based on previous professional performance. While
there is no absolute link between this administrative
screening and promotion to the next pay grade, the quality
cut made by the screening board is very similar to that made
by the separate, statutory promotion board. Successful
screening for these focal point jobs indicates that the
officer has demonstrated those skills and attributes that
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the career development system must produce for the surface
community to effectively carry out its mission.
To support the SWO career planner to perform policy
analysis with respect to PCS cost savings versus their
impact on the professional development of the SWO community,
a career path representation is required. It should be
designed so that ultimately it will be susceptible to
modelling and computational methods. The four focal points
of development serve as the basis for the network represen-
tation of the SWO career path which follows.
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IV. NETWORK REPRESENTATION OF CAREER PATHS
In constructing the framework for a career path model it
is important to capture the essence of a SWO career path and
to explain the major patterns and flows involved in it.
However, it would increase model complexity and detract from
its usefulness to try to incorporate all possible career
paths. Modeling the SWO career paths can be illustrated
using network representations of career paths. Figure 4.1
is one attempt at such a network. This figure presents a
means of classifying the tour assignments of the SWO commu-
nity by tour sequence and activity. Each tour assignment is
described by a two digit alpha-numeric code. The first
digit represents the tour sequence number and increases from
one through twelve referring to the sequential position of
tours progression through which constitutes a career. The
second digit refers to a given activity and is denoted by
one of the letters: A ,B , C ,D , E , F ,G and S. Although grade
and years of completed service (YCS) are not incorporated in
this network, as the tour sequence numbers increase paygrade
and YCS increase with them. The activities listed at the
left depict classifications of billets into such activities
as: professional training, professional education,
Washington tour, shore (CONUS), fleet unit, afloat staff,
shore (OUTUS) and separation. The definitions of the clas-
sifications chosen are listed in Table 5.
To illustrate the working of the network a sample career
path has been included in Figure 4.2. The following discus-
sion of this sample career path will point out the network
features and illustrate its usefulness.
40
< PQ U P w P* o CO
CM CSJ CM CM CM CM CM CM
.-1 r-l r-l r-l r-l r-l r-l r-
1
<d PQ U P W Pn o CO
I—
1
i-l r-l i-l r-l r-l I—
1
I—
I— r-l r-l r-l i-l r-l I— 1—1
< PQ U P w En O COo O O o o o O o
I-l i—
I
i-l I-l I-l I-l i—
I
r-l
< PQ CJ p w Pn o CO
ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON
< PQ u p w P* o CO
00 co co co CO co CO co
< PQ U p . w Pn o CO
r^ r^ r-^ r>. r^ r^ !--» r^.
< PQ u P W Pn o CO
NO vO NO NO NO NO NO NO
<J PQ u P W P=H o CO
m m u-i LT) m m m m
< PQ u p W P* o co
<r <r <r <f <r <f <f <r
< PQ u p w Fn o co
en CO CO m CO CO CO CO
< PQ u P W En o CO





Wco H <JFn PdCO PC'S
o X P*D UH Ofn tfO <:oOS O co OS WM J<3 OH PmM
&&, p4P <!U so JS EnH ED WH









































A. PROFESSIONAL TRAINING: Student billets in either
the SWO Department Head or SWO (Basic) courses of
instruction of duration longer than 20 weeks.
B. PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: Student billets at a'
postgraduate school or a war or staff college
of duration longer than 20 weeks.
C. WASHINGTON TOUR: Shore duty billets in the
Washington Metropolitan area not meeting any
of the criteria in A and B above.
D. SHORE (CONUS): Shore duty billet within the
continental United States not meeting any of
the criteria in A, B and C above.
E. FLEET UNIT: Ship's company sea duty billets.
F. AFLOAT Staff: Afloat staff sea duty billets.
G. SHORE (OUTUS): Non-CONUS shore duty billets.
S. SEPARATION: Loss of officers to the SWO
community. The main reasons are resignation
(voluntary or involuntary), retirement and
lateral transfer to another officer community.
A. SAMPLE CAREER PATH
All career pathways begin with tour 0A. The first digit
"0" indicates that this tour is preliminary to the first
operational billet, tour IE. Although the specific order of
the activities from top to bottom implies no priority what-
soever, the placement of the Fleet Unit activity in the
middle of the network was done to reflect its central posi-
tion in the SWO career path. The lack of a first tour for
the other activities indicates that tour IE is the initial
operational tour served by all Surface Warfare Officers.






































that no Professional Training assignment is feasible as a
second tour for any SWO . The two arrows running from IE to
2B and 2D, respectively, with the numbers 20 and 70 written
alongside each arrow show that in this sample career path 20
% of the officers leaving tour IE proceed to tour 2B and 70
% to tour 2D. The remaining percentages of officers must,
consequently, move to one of the tours 2C, 2E, 2F and 2G
.
These movements are not represented by arrows here because
each is followed by less than 10 °L of the officers
completing tour IE and showing these arrows would distract
from the main career paths being displayed in this figure.
Tour 3A represents an assignment through which all SWOs
staying in the system must pass. Having completed tour 3A,
almost all personnel proceed to 4E. The vast majority of
individuals leaving 4E then proceed to 5E. The sample also
displays the dashed arrow leading to 6S which in lieu of any
other arrows from 5E indicates that all officers following
this sample path leave the system at this point , upon
completion of the fifth tour. The inclusion of separation
as an "activity" in the network reflects the importance of
retaining personnel in the closed Navy personnel system.
Arrows to these separation nodes are dashed to emphasize the
loss of officers whose SWO careers end with that move. The
absence of a separation node indicates separation is not
feasible at that career point due to the obligation of
service from a previous tour.
In summary, the essential features of the network are:
1. The network consists of a matrix of nodes each repre-
senting a tour of duty in the career path of SWOs.
2. These tours are designated by two digit codes. The
first digit, a number, represents the tour sequence
number and increases from left to right. The second
digit, a letter, denotes one of the eight activities
described in Table 5.
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3. Arrows connecting nodes indicate PCS moves of indi-
viduals from one tour to another.
4. The absence of a node from the network indicates that
an individual pathway may not progress through that
node .
5. Two tours with no arrow connecting them does not
negate the feasibility of a movement between them,
but it does indicate that less than ten percent of
the officers completing the first tour move to the
second tour.
6. Dashed lines indicate PCS separation moves out of the
system.
7. The lack of a separation activity node suggests that
an individual may not separate at that career point
because of remaining obligated service.
B. ACTUAL CAREER PATHS
In constructing the career pathways every effort was
made to accurately represent the actual professional devel-
opment flow of Surface Warfare officers occurring today. In
doing so the assumption was made that the SWO career
displayed in Figure 1.1 found in Chapter I could be repre-
sented by a series of career paths.
The career pathways were constructed based on discus-
sions and reviews with OP- 130 and NMPC 41 personnel. It is
felt these pathways accurately represent, within allowable
tolerances, the actual movement patterns of Surface Warfare
Officers today. The guidelines employed in their construc-
tion were that the flows should represent , with a perceived
accuracy of ninety percent, the actual flows of officers
detailed this year. Concern was not with including the
outlying exceptions but rather with representing the stan-
dard career paths SWOs undertake.
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The career paths of about 90% of all SWOs will be
divided into seven "groups" , each group shown in a separate
figure. The seven groups are based on the degree of attain-
ment of the four focal points of professional development
discussed in Chapter III. The first five groups are based
on the number of focal point tours served which can range
from a maximum of four to zero. The first group of pathways
includes service in all four focal point tours culminating
in major command. The second group includes service in only
the first three focal point tours, the last one being
command at sea. The third group contains service in the
first two focal point tours and ends with failing to screen
for commander command. The fourth group is composed of
paths through the department head tours followed by not
screening for executive officer. The fifth group contains
paths representing the careers of officers failing to screen
for Department Head School, the first of the focal points.
Although these five groups cover all of the. possibili-
ties, deviations from the advertised career path shown in
Figure 1.1, do occur following the initial sea tour and
again during the first department head tour. The sixth
group includes the pathways of those officers serving a
sequential sea tour following their initial sea tour.
Finally, the seventh group is comprised of the paths of
officers serving their initial department head tour as
members of the pre- commissioned unit of a ship and do not
serve the second leg of the split tour. While these could
have been included in previously discussed groups such
inclusion would have unnecessarily complicated the graphs of
those groups of career paths. A summary list of these seven
groups is given in Table 6.
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TABLE 6
Surface Warfare Officer Career Pathways
1. Pathways of Officers Leading to Major Command
2. Pathways of Officers Leading to Commander Command
but Failing to Screen for Major Command
3. Pathways of Officers Leading to Executive Officer
Assignment but Failing to Screen for Commander
Command
4. Pathways of Officers Leading to Department Head
Assignment but Failing to Screen for Executive
Officer
5. Pathways of Officers Failing to Screen for
Department Head
6. Pathways of Officers Leading to Major Command
Who Serve a Post-Division Officer Sequential
Sea Tour
7. Pathways of Officers Leading to Major Command
Who Serve a Single Department Head Tour in a
Pre- commissioning Billet
1. Pathways of Officers Leading to Maj or Command
The attainment of major command presupposes service
in all four focal point tours. Figure 4.3 illustrates these
paths to major command. The requirement for an officer to
advance to major command necessitates that he has success-
fully screened for tours at each of the three previous focal
points of development: department head, executive officer,
and commanding officer.
Tour OA represents the SWO (Basic) training course.
With its completion all SWO trainees proceed to their
initial shipboard tour (Tour IE). Upon completion of this
thirty month sea tour approximately two-thirds of a given
year group will go ashore to postgraduate (PG) school (Tour
2B), or to shore duty either in CONUS (Tour 2D), or in OUTUS
47
(Tour 2G). The remaining third of the year group will be
required to serve a follow-on sea tour either aboard another
ship (Tour 2E) or as an afloat staff officer (Tour 2F).
Although some officers may go straight to Department Head
School (Tour 3A) following the second eighteen month sea
tour (Tour 2E or 2F), most officers will go ashore for their
third tour. For this latter group of officers not going
ashore until the third tour, a separate pathway will be
discussed later in this chapter.
Upon completion of the second tour the department
head school (Tour 3A) follows for those completing a shore
tour and those coming from a second sea tour who desire to
do so. Because a two year obligation is incurred with
attendance at department head school, SWOs proceeding to
their fourth tour are not eligible to resign and all proceed
to their first department head tour (Tour 4E). Among those
proceeding to precommissioning ships most will serve only
one long department head tour and not participate in the
split-tour program explained in Section A of Chapter III.
For these individuals a modified career path is necessary
and will be discussed later in this chapter. The next tour
is the second half of the department head tour (Tour 5D, 5E
or 5F)
.
The sixth tour includes a host of duty assignments
all served ashore. Postgraduate education or a service
college (Tour 6B), Washington duty (Tour 6C), or other CONUS
(Tour 6D) or overseas billets (Tour 6G) could be included.
These last three would serve the purpose of gaining experi-
ence and/or subspecialty utilization.
At this, point in an officer's career he is most
probably a LCDR and has a 60-70 percent chance of serving
the non-XO LCDR sea tour. The majority of officers will
serve two sequential LCDR sea tours at this point, one of
which is the XO tour (Tour 7E or 8E) as the career path in
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Figure 4.3 shows. The order of the two tours depends upon
the officer's seniority and billet requirements at the time.
If the XO tour (Tour 7E) is served first then a post-XO LCDR
sea tour (Tour 8E or 8F) will follow. The billets available
for Tour 8E or 8F would include among others, chief staff
officer of a DESRON staff or CO of a minesweeper. During
the ninth tour attendance at a service college (Tour 9B) or
continued experience or subspecialty utilization (Tours 9C,
9D or 9G) constitute the primary tours served. Following
completion of this ninth tour, command at sea (Tour 10E)
follows. While Tour 10E is a twenty-seven month tour it is
preceded by a five month training pipeline making the tour
actually thirty-two months long or longer.
Tours specifically requiring command- experienced
officers comprise the majority of billets during the tenth
tour. Annually twenty-seven surface warfare officers are
required to attend the senior course at the Naval War
College. This ten month course is designed specifically for
those officers destined for future positions of greater
responsibility in the Navy. The remaining post- command
officers will fill the other 154 billets afloat and ashore
which call for these post-command officers.
At this point in the career path officers either
hold the rank of captain or are captain- selectees and will
be detailed as such. Most major command selectees will
proceed to their major command tour (Tour 12D, 12E or 12F)
following completion of the eleventh tour. For those
serving at sea in Tour 11E/11F and those completing a War
College tour (Tour 11B), a shore tour (Tour 12C, 12D, or
12G), or a War College tour (Tour 12B) for those who have
not already attended, may follow with major command




2. Pathways of Officers Leading to Commander Command
but Failing to Screen for Maj or Command
Officers in the second group of career pathways
reach the third focal point of professional development,
that of command-at- sea in the grade of commander, but
subsequently do not screen for major command. These paths
are identical to the major command pathways until the
twelfth tour. While major command requires previous selec-
tion for captain, statistics reveal that in FY 1981-1985
71.5 percent of post-command URL officers were selected for
captain while 98.1 percent of those post command URL offi-
cers who also had proven subspecialties were selected for
that grade during the same period as shown in Table 3 found
in Chapter III. The assumption is made that these officers
will be selected for captain during their eleventh tour
although some of the more senior ones may be selected during
their command tours (Tour 10E). While specific billet
assignment will vary at this career stage dependent on
selection status to captain, the billet activity arrows to
tour twelve will not change with one exception. The flow of
officers to Tour 12E or any subsequent E billet activities
will not exist. These officers may continue to serve in all
other tours including afloat staff billets to utilize their
expertise, particularly that gained during command.
3
.
Pathways of Officers Leading to Executive Officer
Assignment but Failing to Screen for Commander
Command
Officers having post-executive officer pathways
advance to the second career development focal point but do
not screen for command. As was the case with the previous
pathways, this parallels the major command paths, shown in
Figure 4.3, but only through the ninth tour. At this point


















































for commanders who have not yet screened for command to
enhance their records by detailing them back to sea in a
ship's company or afloat staff capacity (Tours 10E or 10F)
.
For others, continued subspecialty utilization in Tours IOC
and 10D are the primary activities assigned at this career
stage. For this group, assignments to fleet units following
the tenth tour (Tours HE and E activity tours subsequent to
it) are not done as may be seen by the deletion of Tour HE
in Figure 1.5. Assignments subsequent to the tenth tour
include tours in Washington, D.C., other CONUS shore activi-
ties and OUTUS activities as shown by the arrows to Tours
11C, 11D and 11G, respectively. Tours for following assign-
ments continue to be to these same activities.
Since historically 95 percent of previous LCDR
executive officers select for CDR, it is assumed in this
pathway that all do so. For those officers not selecting
for captain, DOPMA requires retirement prior to the start of
the 27th year of commissioned service. For those officers
who may promote to captain based largely on their subspe-
cialty record, retention into the 30th year of commissioned
service is permitted.
4. Pathways of Officers Leading to Department Head
Assignment but Failing to Screen for Executive
Officer
Officers in this group advance through only the
first focal point of professional development, completion of
the department head tour. As was true in previous groups,
this group of pathways shown in Figure 4.6 is the same as
those of the Major Command group, seen in Figure 4.3,
through completion of the sixth tour. Since the selection
rate for LCDR is 85 percent and the quality cut for depart-
ment head screening is very similar (90 percent of a YG who







































































this pathway are selected for LCDR, and this promotion
occurs at approximately the nine and a half year point. A
recent survey conducted by NMPC 411, the surface LCDR
detailing shop, indicates this will occur during the fourth
or early in the fifth tour. The impact here is that many
officers serving their second department head tour (Tour 5E)
are filling LT department head billets as LCDRs . This rank
mismatch between department head grades and billet require-
ments is a problem and will be further addressed in Chapter
VI.
The sixth tour is shore duty for all officers.
Here, Postgraduate School or a service college (Tour 6B),
subspecialty utilization or experience tours in Tours 6C,
6D, or 6F are options. Following the sixth tour, officers
will be ordered to sea duty to fill complex LCDR sea billets
(Tours 7E and 7F) shown in Figure 4.6. These complex
billets include, but are not limited to, navigator, CIC
officer and key engineering billets aboard major ships and
staffs. Current XO selectivity is sixty percent and
expected to rise slightly (possibly to seventy percent).
With a seventy-five percent promotion opportunity for CDR,
the assumption is generally made that the 60% of a YG who
screen for XO are also selected for CDR. This means that
the 40% of that YG who failed to screen for XO must compete
for the remaining 15% of the promotions still available (75%
promotion opportunity minus 60% who screened for XO ) . These
officers then have only a thirty-seven and a half percent
chance (15% divided by 40%) of making CDR. Therefore sixty-
two and a half percent of those who achieve only the first
focal point of development will not be selected for CDR and
will retire as LCDRs. The thirty-seven and a half percent
who do advance to CDR will be screened again for executive
officer. While all tours are available to these officers
who do not screen for X.O. , the Postgraduate School portion
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(Tours 8B and the B activity tours following it) is assumed
not to be available after the seventh tour due to the risk
of non-promotion and the limited numbers of seats available
for CDRs . Attendance at a junior staff college course (the
other portion of Tour 8B) is included as this would qualify
an officer to utilize his training in the joint services
staff area. The remainder of the career path requires that
these officers be utilized in areas of their subspecialty or
other significant expertise. Subsequent tours will be
served mainly in shore CONUS (Tour 8C and other C activity
tours) or shore OUTUS (Tour 8G and those G activity tours
following it); although, some will serve in Washington (Tour
8C and other C activity tours following it). This pattern
depicted in Figure 4.6 will continue until DOPMA mandated
retirement points are reached or earlier separation occurs.
DOPMA requires retirement with twenty years of service for
LCDRs and twenty six years for CDRs unless continued on
active duty. Because the number continued annually is so
small, for simplification purposes, the assumption is made
that none are continued.
5. Pathways of Officers Failing to Screen for
Department Head
This group of career pathways reflects the pathways
of those individuals who do not serve in any of the four
focal point tours. This pathway shown in Figure 4.7 depicts
a brief career served only in activities C,D,E,F,G and ulti-
mately S. With a YG department head selection rate of
ninety-five percent for those who remain in the service, and
a selection rate to LCDR of ninety-five percent, it is
assumed that an officer who does not screen for department
head school will not be selected to LCDR. Therefore DOPMA
requires a LT be separated from the Navy within the first
year following his second non- selection to LCDR. Due to the
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promotional risk of an officer in this group, postgraduate
school and service colleges (Tours 2B and B activity tours
following it) are not available options and have been
deleted. Immediately following his division officer tour
the individual may be offered a follow-on sea billet (Tour
2E or 2F) in an attempt to "get well" professionally. If
these are non-existent he is ordered ashore for either a
Washington (Tour 2C), CONUS (Tour 2D), or OUTUS (Tour 2G)
assignment. Subsequent tours (Tours 3C, 3D, 3G and
following tours) are served in accordance with the needs of
the Navy as depicted in Figure 4.7 until voluntary or forced
resignation occurs.
This pathway also incorporates those who may fail to
qualify as a Surface Warfare Officer or those removed from
their ships for other lack of aptitude reasons. If selected
to LT the above would apply; if not this pathway would
continue to apply but forced separation would occur earlier
after two unsuccessful LT selection attempts, at approxi-
mately the five and one-half year point at the end of the
second tour.
6 . Pathways of Officers Leading to Major Command Who
Serve a Post -Division Officer Sequential Sea Tour
Thirty- four percent of a year group are required to
remain at sea for a sequential junior officer tour. The
small portion of officers who elect to attend department
head school immediately following this second sea tour are
included in the Major Command subsection. The remaining
officers are included in the Post Division Officer
Sequential Sea Tour pathway group shown in Figure 4.8.
Following completion of the initial operational tour
at sea (Tour IE) reassignment is made to a follow-on sea
tour (Tour 2E or 2F). This eighteen month tour is followed























































the third tour all proceed to Department Head School (Tour
4A) . The net result of sequential sea tours is that the
third through the seventh tours in the major command
pathway, Figure 4.3, are delayed one tour and become the
fourth through eighth tours as depicted in Figure 4.8. The
eighth tour (Tour 8E) is the XO tour for all in this
category. The assumption is made that these thirty-plus
percent officers serving the initial sequential sea tour are
the same thirty percent of the LCDRs not required to do the
other LCDR sea tour; i.e. , if a SWO does an extra tour as a
junior officer he does not do one as a LCDR.
At this career stage those on this pathway rejoin
their year group contemporaries. From the ninth tour on,
this group is identical to either the major command pathway
(Figure 4.3) or if an officer in this path fails to screen
for the focal point of CO he follows the post- executive
officer pathway (Figure 4.4). Should he fail to screen for
executive officer he joins the post -department head pathway
(Figure 4.5) at tour eight. Due to the high quality cut
required to be assigned to this early sequential sea tour
the assumption is made that all officers in this pathway
will screen for department head if they have not done so
already
.
7 . Pathways of Officers Leading to Maj or Command Who
Serve a Single Department Head Tour in a
Pre- commissioning Billet
The final group of pathways includes those individ-
uals who serve only one department head tour (Tour 4E ) as a
member of a ship's precommissioning crew. While the propor-
tion of a year group of officers who have done this has
recently been as high as twenty percent, the current number
is ten percent and should decrease further as the remaining
FFG-7 Class frigates are all delivered to the Navy. Tour




















































commissioning time and the specific billet held. Combining
this with precommissioning time, total tour lengths are
normally about three years long. The tour lengths for the
FFG-7 Class Combat Systems and Engineering Officers, for
example, are 32 and 36 months respectively following a one
year training period. This one year period will include
formal schools, team training and ship familiarization.
This very long tour thus substitutes for the normal two
department head split tours. The impact of this on the
career pathway is that the second half of the department
head split tour (Tours 5E or 5F) in the Major Command
pathway (Figure 4.3) is deleted and the subsequent sixth
through twelfth tours become the fifth through eleventh
tours shown in Figure 4.9.
In summary, these seven pathway groups are consid-
ered to be valid representations of the actual movement of
surface warfare officers. The basic tenet of this chapter
has been that the lack of attainment of each successive
focal point of professional development specifies a distinct
SWO career pathway. Having thus determined network repre-
sentations of the SWO career path, geographic billet anal-
ysis and historical tour length analysis will follow in
Chapters V and VI.
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V. GEOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS OF BILLET REQUIREMENTS
The primary driving force behind the Navy's manpower-
personnel policy is billet requirements as discussed in
Chapter II. When discussing PCS moves and costs it is
essential to examine the geographical location of billets
Surface Warfare Officers are required to fill. This is
because knowledge of these billet locations is necessary to
determine the extent to which it is possible to profession-
ally develop officers through their careers within the same
geographical location, thereby reducing the requirement to
transfer. While the allocation of these billets varies
slightly from year to year, a method has been devised to
determine the number of billets SWOs are required to fill at
a point in time.
A. SOURCE OF DATA
The data source for this information was the Navy
Officer Billet File (NOBF) maintained by OP-122. Using
Statistical Analysis System (SAS) computer programs to draw
data from the file and later hand manipulation to correct
inconsistencies of location, geographic billet data was
extracted from the NOBF to display billets by location,
grade, and designator within grade.
For those locations hypothesized to have large concen-
trations of fleet units, i.e. large homeports, data was
extracted using the variable AREA/CITY. This three letter
code identifies specific geographic localities such as "FNO"
for Norfolk and "KSD" for San Diego. The intent here was to
break down billets by areas to examine the feasibility of
retouring SWOs from sea to shore or vice versa in the same
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area. Since a SWO ' s career path basically consists of a
sea/shore alternating rotation, this type of billet analysis
was deemed important especially in connection with PCS
costs. For those areas without fleet unit concentrations
billet information was extracted using the variable MOBLOC.
This two digit number identifies larger geographical areas
and is comprised of numerous AREA/CITY codes. Samples of
these are "20" for Europe, "19" for the Washington, D.C.
Metropolitan area and "09" for the North Central United
States. While some homeports have large sea duty require-
ments, such as Norfolk with 1388 billets, others have only a
few sea duty requirements, e.g. Key West, Florida has only
twenty-nine billets.
In order to minimize the number of homeports it was
determined that setting the homeport cutoff size at thirty
sea duty billets for OUTUS locations and one hundred for
CONUS locales would provide the best choice: small enough to
include the major homeports and large enough to exclude the
relatively minor ones. This breakdown resulted in ten areas
falling within this criteria. These are classified as Fleet
Concentration Areas and are listed in Table 7.
The remaining locations were considered non-fleet
concentration areas and were subdivided geographically into
the areas shown in Table 8.
B. DATA MANIPULATION
Developing a method for determining SWO billet require-
ments at a point in time is a complicated process. There
are three basic designator coded billet types SWOs are
required to fill: 1000, 1050 and 1110 billets. The defini-
tions of these are listed in Table 9. The three other
Billet Codes in Table 9 identify other billet codes and














1140 communities are included under the "umbrella" of SWO
billet fill responsibility for 1000/1050 designated billets.
Because their community sizes are so small compared to the
1110 (SWO) community their quotas are included within the
SWO quota.
.
No major inaccuracies are anticipated due to
this inclusion.
Two other assumptions were made in presenting the data.
First, because the 1160 code indicates SWO trainee billets,
these 1160 designated billets were merged with 1110 desig-
nated billets for the same paygrade . Sea billets coded 1000
for LT and below were also grouped with 1110 billets for the
same paygrade since the numbers are small and this usually
occurs in actual practice. No adverse impact to the anal-
ysis is anticipated as a result of these inclusions.
Due to a Navy-wide shortage of Unrestricted Line




1. CONUS except Washington, D.C. area
2. Washington, D.C. area




7. Central and South America and Caribbean Islands




This plan which allocates billets to the various URL commu-
nities on a "fair share" basis, is maintained by NMPC 45 and
is updated monthly. This plan accounts for billets
programmed to be rotated in a given period, officers avail-
able to fill them during that period, percentages of the
communities already filling 1000/1050 billets and several
other items
.
This plan - incorporates the major manpower claimants
(MMCs ) billet gapping specifications and generates a goal
for each community to fill both 1000 and 1050 designated
billets. The goal assigned to the SWO community for October
1984 are included in Table 10. The term "gapped billets" to
be used below indicates valid NOBF billets which are desig-
nated to be vacant by the MMCs. The plan also specifies the
total number of 1000/1050 billets to be filled by all
eligible officers as defined in Table 9. The total number
of 1000/1050 billets with the gapped billets subtracted are
given in Table 11.
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TABLE 9
Designator Codes and Descriptions
Billet Code Billet Description
1000 Unrestricted Line officer billet which may
be filled by an appropriately skilled and
experienced officer.
1050 Unrestricted Line officer billet requiring
an officer qualified in any one of the
warfare specialties (LT and above).
1110 Unrestricted Line officer billet requiring
Surface Warfare qualification or afloat
billets leading to such qualification.
1130 Unrestricted Line officer billet requiring
Special Warfare (UDT/SEAL) qualification.
1140 Unrestricted Line officer billet requiring
a Special Operations officer qualification
1160 Unrestricted Line officer billet for an





























The final two data items needed to develop a composite
number of billets to be filled by SWOs are the number of OMP
gapped 1110 billets and the number of 1110 designated
billets ashore. This information is contained in Tables 12
and 13
.
The assumption was made that the OMP correction
factor would only be applied to 1110 shore billets since sea
billets necessarily have a higher priority. The data
concerning 1000/1050/1110 designated billets in the Navy
located at each of the places listed in Tables III and IV
were then used as a basis to adapt the OMP. Using the data
from Tables 10, 11 and 12 "billet correction factors" were
developed for each of the billet designators, 1000, 1050 and
1110.
C. RESULTS
Using grade and designator data from Tables 10, 11, 12
and 13 a proportion was derived for the fraction of all
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TABLE 12
Number of 1110 Shore Billets Designated















billets of designators 1000, 1050 and 1110 to be filled by
SWOs . This proportion represents the portion of 1000, 1050
or 1110 designated billets SWOs are required to fill. It is
hypothesized that applying this proportion against the
number of actual billets with the same designator in each
location and in each grade and then summing these totals for
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the 1000/1050/1110 designated billets will yield a valid
composite for the location, paygrade and type of duty.
The results of the geographical billet analysis are
shown in Appendix E. Individual tables were compiled for
each of the nine non-fleet concentration areas given in
Table 8 and for those ten areas having large fleet concen-
trations listed in Table 7. The following example will
illustrate this. In Europe the actual captain shore billets
include forty-five 1000 designator, fifteen 1050 designator
and six 1110 designator billets (refer to Table 31 in
Appendix E). From Tables 10, 11, 12 and 13 the following
proportions are developed: 232/552 or 0.42 for 1000 desig-
nated captain billets; 106/249 or 0.43 for 1050 designated
captain billets; and (227 - 22)/227 or 0.90 for 1110 desig-
nated captain shore billets. These fractions are then
multiplied by the number of billets, forty-five, fifteen and
six respectively. Summing these products yields 30.72 which
is rounded to 31 and represents the shore composite number
of captain billets SWOs are required to fill in Europe. The
procedure was the same for the European sea billets except
that 1110 sea billets are manned at 100%; hence the
(227-22)/227 1110 captain OMP shore correction factor was
not applied. This yielded a total of 1.85 which when
rounded to two reflects the composite number of sea billets
in Europe 1110 designated captains are required to fill.
Adding the sea and shore composites (31 and 2) equals 33,
the total number of European billets SWO captains are
required to fill. The results of the individual nineteen
locations from Appendix E were aggregated into Tables 14 and
15. The figure of 33 billets derived in the above example
is recorded in column one of Table 14.
These two tables provide some insight as to the numbers
of billets within each geographic location. Of particular
note are both the large numbers of billets in the ten fleet
71











o CO LO l-< <t m o i—
i
o o a> 03
<1J CO »-) LO CO 1-1 i— r-i U
j-i oj H r-l CM 4-1






<U4_) H CNI CM .—1 00 <3- CM o o o CJN 4-)
-0 03 J va- CM on CM CM -3- (U













m ro CM CM vO U





w PQPt. rtJ i C
PQ m c o
< o o 4->H fe 00
CO Pi ON o- r-i m m CM <t I— o r^ c
<u cJ Q m LO vO m CM m •H











o3 4-i H 1—1 o o CO ON O r-i r-l 1—1 vr> i-H
U P< i—
1
V£> CO r-l r-l en O
•HT3 <1 I— CNJ <t C




03-rl O CO <U 4-1
»H 3 • •HT) CM O O
oocr o uc •H e
O Q) . <U o3 ^cm


















w * ao i-H d) r-l C CO H .
.
pi c 03 <U 05 03 .0 03 o3T) 03 cu
<j to •H r* a O fc.O ^ c -a W 4-)p ^ CO o 03 •H 4-1-H UTS o3 03 © o
z CO 03 5-i •H u CH CO GrH C 5 z• o 03 i—
l
3 CO M-l <U 03 D 05 co 03
u s < w <: <: uu <:rHM U o
72
c/3 <r i-l <r ON ON r-l m VO CM CO <J-
is i—
i
r>» -j- 1—1 CO m <i- 00 rH NO <frW o- i-i 1—1 <f
rH
O NO 00 <i- o CO r-l 00 r^» m o CM
<U •-) CM >3- i-i CO o NO oo NO rH u-) O
Jh H <r —I 1—1 <f <f







cu o H i—l u-> CM o CM CM <f O NO <f NO
TJ-H J co on rH 1-1 oo vO no ON CO OO
Oj4-> i—l CO rH 1-1 <t- <f






4-> O Pi NO m CM vO -d- 00 00 ON <r m m
(UU O m co f^ vO ON CO CO m CM oo







W CQ CUJ i—l
eo M-lfn
<! OH C
CO-H Pi r^ NO UO CM oo ON 1—1 i—
i
<f oo rH
•H Q co CM <r <f ON CM CO r~^ CM rH
CO i—
1








03 T) H r^ CO NO i-l r^ f>» oo 00 <r NO r^
U 0) P* i—i o i—l i—l r^ 1—1 CM oo















<J --_ cd 4-) GO ccJ --C CCJ o
u 4-1 A5-H CO 4-1 cu cu oJ 03 X H
Pi U I—l C cu u •H PQ H3 5-i •H 3
<u o OH rH o Q CUfi, •H CO W
o- <H QO 5-i a GO s oJ B o Q
5 5-1 H oJ >^ C C oJ C 5 03 X 3cu o H rC 0) 03 o rH 03 03 3 o
13 s> CJ £ en 1-1 <Jca X O >" O
73
concentration areas and also the numbers of billets not in
the non-fleet concentration areas which require PCS moves to
transfer between the two. As may be readily discerned from
Table 14 the vast majority of billets not in the fleet
concentration areas are in Washington, D.C. and other CONUS
areas. The portion of shore duty billets in Washington,
D.C. increases with each paygrade. The magnitude of the
Washington requirement may be seen by the fact that forty-
six percent of all captain shore tour billets are in the
Washington, D.C. area.
While a discussion of the fleet and non-fleet concentra-
tion areas and billet data by homeport has occurred, a
further breakdown specifically for department head billets
follows. The split-tour policy which requires that officers
transfer to a second department head tour after eighteen
months makes it important for PCS cost savings that these
tours be served in the same homeport. An analysis of the
location of the department head billets is important to test
this. Table 16 shows a breakdown of all department head
billets by homeport and split-tour half. An important
constraint that was introduced in Chapter III is that all
officers be afforded the opportunity to serve on a cruiser/
destroyer/frigate (CRUDES) type ship.
Since first and second half billets total 541 and 483
respectively, it may be observed from Table 16 that those
individuals serving half their split tour in San Francisco,
Concord, Seattle, Sasebo, Guam, Subic Bay, Key West, Panama
City, New York City, and Earle will have to move at least
once since there are no CRUDES type ships in these home-
ports. Couple this with large billet mismatches in several
locations between the first and second department head tours
and the number required to move between tours becomes even
larger. In Pearl Harbor, for example, the ratio 34/16
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indicates thirty-four first half department head tours
exist, and only sixteen second half department head tours
exist. The same holds true for Mayport (73/27),
Philadelphia (11/4) and Newport (16/1). In fact, ninety of
the 483 second half department heads (or almost 20%) will
have to change homeports at the absolute minimum .
Having completed the geographical analysis of billet
locations the next analysis concerns past tour lengths to
determine the presence of trends or relationships among
them. This will be discussed in Chapter VI.
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VI. HISTORICAL TOUR LENGTH ANALYSIS
The data base used in this analysis was the Officer
Longitudinal Master File or OLMF . This data base consisting
of Navy officers of all designators both active and inactive
is maintained by the Naval Military Personnel Command and
represents individual officers' service history, qualifica-
tions attained and schools completed. These multiple
entries are updated periodically and each subsequent entry
represents more complete, up-to-date information than does
the previous one. Due to file construction limitations,
only the seven most recent past duty stations are included.
While this detracts from the total record, the magnitude of
personnel policy changes which have occurred during an offi-
cer's last seven tours makes any data older than that too
remote to remain relevant
.
A. TOUR LENGTH ANALYSIS OF KEY TOURS
In an attempt to validate actual tour lengths over a
period of time it was decided to concentrate initially on
the executive officer and commander commanding officer
tours . These tours were chosen because they are the two
central ones of the four focal points of development. The
first step was to extract from the data only the most recent
entry of each surface warfare officer. This yielded a data
set of 16942 records of individual SWOs . In each record the
information of most value were the seven previous tours, 1
beginning and ending dates with corresponding Navy Officer
x This represents the maximum number capable of being
held in the rile. A more junior officer who had served
fewer than seven tours would nave all his tours indicated in
his record. Tours served in a DUINS capacity are not
included in these tours.
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Billet Classification (NOBC) for each tour. This four digit
code identifies the qualitative requirements of each billet.
These codes are listed and defined in the Manual of Navy




a. Executive Officer Tour
Utilizing the NOBC "9228" identifying the
Executive Officer (Afloat) billet, 3185 observations were
selected from the data set. For each individual filling
these billets the tour ending date, the number of months of
commissioned service at tour start and the tour length were
calculated. Examining the actual data retrieved revealed
that some months of commissioned service (MCS) at tour start
were outside the range normally associated with the standard
executive officer tour. It was hypothesized that these
represented XO tours served by LTs or by senior CDRs
following a command tour. Because neither of these has a
separate NOBC the hypothesis was made that restricting the
months of commissioned service to the approximate seniority
of LCDRs and junior CDRs would effectively isolate the tour
required. More exactly, billets filled by officers with
less than nine years or more than eighteen years of commis-
sioned service at tour start were omitted.
Also some missing or negative tour lengths were
found in 663 records. Since these were obviously due to
incorrect or incomplete data insertions they were deleted.
The final result was a sample of 2522 executive officer
tours, down from the original 3185, representing a drop of
20.8 percent. An average tour length was computed for tours
completed in the same year. Information for the last
fifteen years is included below as Table 18. The first row,
e.g., is interpreted as follows: In 1969, 105 officers
completed the LCDR/Early CDR Executive Officer Afloat tour.
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They had an average of 146.8 months of commissioned service
at the start of the tour and the average tour length was
18.3 months. Table 18 reveals a fairly consistent tour
length over the period, while the MCS has fluctuated more.
Even though variations have occurred, the XO tour has been
relatively stable.
TABLE 18
LCDR/Early CDR Executive Officer Afloat
Data
Tour Length
Year End n MCS Tour Length
(Months)
69 105 146.8 18.3
70 100 145.0 18.1
71 123 148.1 18.8
72 113 143.1 17.8
73 113 147.5 19.6
74 102 149.5 19.9
75 124 149.4 21.4
76 139 157.4 20.3
77 142 157.3 21.1
78 154 156.4 22.1
79 143 162.1 21.2
80 163 164.4 19.9
81 173 158.2 19.9
82 186 157.6 20.2
83 228 160.0 20.1
80
b. Commander Commanding Officer Afloat Tour
The method utilized for the CO tour is very
similar to that used for the XO tour with one exception.
For the CO tour two NOBCs are germane: 9222 and 9235. NOBC
9222 is used to designate all afloat commands, without
regard to grade. NOBC 9235, specifically instituted on 1
July 1977 to reflect the CO afloat tour in the ' grade of
commander, requires a formal command screening board
approval which NOBC 9222 does not. Attempts to integrate
data from the two NOBCs were unsuccessful because of the
differing constraints. For this reason only the data from
NOBC 9235 was actually used. The breakdown by year the tour
ended, the number of officers completing tours, the average
number of months of commissioned service at tour start and
the average tour length in months are shown in Table 19.
TABLE 19
Commanding Officer Aflo at (CDR) T our L ength Data
Year End n MCS Tour Length
(months
)
79 23 198.3 20.3
80 67 196.2 24.3
81 85 202.8 22.9
82 101 208.5 24.2
83 74 213. 1 23.3
As was the case with the XO data, missing or
negative tour length values were prevalent as were miscod-
ings suggesting actual tour completions in future years.
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These types of errors (numbering 261) were deleted from the
CO tour data. This left 372 data points from the original
633 observations. The small number of officers shown
completing the tour in 1979 and 1980 is misleading as these
reflect only the slow implementation of NOBC 9235 and not a
diminished opportunity.
B. HISTORICAL SWO TOUR LENGTH ANALYSIS BY TYPE ASSIGNMENT
1 . Approach
Having reviewed tour lengths for the two central
focal points of development, the final stage in the histor-
ical analysis of SWO tour lengths centered around the use of
the "type assignment code." Once again the data base used
was the OLMF . Within it, the type assignment code differen-
tiates tours served by type of duty (e.g. sea or shore) and
also by location (e.g. Alaska, Hawaii, other OUTUS). The
meaning of each type assignment code is given in Table 20.
The original SWO data subset previously described
was the starting point in this data collection. Each obser-
vation was then subdivided into those tours already
completed. This yielded a previous tours inventory of 62510
or an average of 3.7 tours per individual. This tour inven-
tory was then reduced by deleting tour assignment codes no
longer used and tours that started prior to 1968. This
yielded a data set with 52151 tours, a decrease of 16.6%
from the original SWO data set. A key component within the
SAS program was the identification of the officer's paygrade
at the time of each tour start. While this was essential,
it was available only through the manipulation of six
variables
.
The goal of this specific analysis was to determine
over time the progression of tour lengths by paygrade and





A. Alaska (Shore Duty)
B. Sea Duty
D. Deployed ship or squadron
homeported outside U.S.
G. Other non-military U.S.
Government Agency
H. Hawaii (Shore Duty)
0. OUTUS (Shore Duty)
S. Shore (Duty)
was to take note of consistently decreasing tour length
trends and areas where stated tour length policy differed
significantly from actual data. This way tour length or




The average tour length for Surface Warfare officers
was found to be 23.43 months spanning the period 1970 to
1983. Since 1970 the yearly average increased steadily from
17.23 months in 1970 to 25.43 months in 1975. Since then
the average length has remained relatively steady as shown
in Table 21.
A stated objective of this study was to break this
data down further to determine average PCS tour lengths by
tour type and pay grade. The tour type breakdown is by the
seven type assignment codes listed in Table 20. Subdividing
the data of average historical tour length by paygrade
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TABLE 21




















yielded the average tour lengths shown in Table 22. The
number of observations in each cell is shown in parentheses.
Not shown in Table 22 are the observations for Alaska and
other non-military U.S. Government Agencies because their
numbers were insignificant. The data in Table 22 may be
compared favorably with the current tour length policy shown
in Table 23.
However to gain a better understanding of recent
trends which may exist in the various type assignments it is
necessary to look at each one separately. For this portion
of the analysis only recent data from 1979-1983 were used to
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provide a more relevant analysis which would, reflect more
the current policies. Only the three type assignments with
the largest number of observations were examined. These
were Sea, OUTUS Shore and Shore (Duty), and the results are
given in Tables 24, 25, and 26. The numbers in parentheses
represent the number of observations in each cell. Each of
these three tables are discussed in turn.
Table 24 reflects a steady or slightly increasing
tour length trend over the years 1979 to 1983 for all grades
except LCDR, LT and LTJG . Yet these exceptions are above
the 18-month tours prescribed for the sequential initial sea
tour and the department head tours (see Table 23). The CDR
tours largely representing the CO tour is increasing in
length towards the 27-month policy instituted in 1982. All
tour lengths reflect stated policy and no rapidly decreasing
trends are evident.
Table 25, addressing OUTUS Shore tours shows that
all documented tours are less than the DoD stated goal of
thirty-six months even though these have the greatest
stability of the three type assignments. Of note are the
small number of tours the analysis is based on in many
paygrades . It is not surprising the ENS numbers are so
small since at this career point they should be serving
their initial sea tour. These tour lengths reflect to a
large extent the need for SWOs to rotate back to sea duty
for the next professional development stage and not remain
ashore for extended periods.
Table 26 displays the Shore (duty) data, and results
parallel those in OUTUS Shore tours, although tour lengths
are shorter. As in Table 25, tour lengths generally
increase with seniority yet decrease with captains . The
steadily decreasing trend for LT tour lengths does not
appear to support NMPC contentions that due to the depart-
ment head school backlog LTs are spending longer tours
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ashore waiting for a quota to become available. This claim
coupled with a steadily rising retention during this period
seems to be at odds with the findings here. As was the case
in Table 25 ENSs are serving at sea and so not enough data
in CONUS is generated.
These findings generally are in concurrence with the
SWO tour length policy shown in Table 23. Sea duty tour
lengths for ENSs through LCDRs are all approximately two
months in excess of stated requirements (30, 18, 18, and 18
months for the four grades). The disparity between the NMPC
advertised LT CONUS Shore tour length trend and the data
cannot be explained. The remaining tour length findings
reflect the primary need of SWOs to serve at sea and not
remain ashore.
Having thus examined tour lengths from a historical
perspective, an examination of alternatives follows. Two




VII. PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES
At this point in the study it is important to digest the
previous work and look for alternatives; means by which the
SWO career path may be made more efficient. This must be
considered while continuing to maintain at least the same
level of professional development.
A. REDUCING COMMAND OPPORTUNITY
Although any hint of reduction of the commander command
opportunity may seem blasphemous to the traditionalist
surface warfare officer, its potential impact should be
assessed. The fact that the demanding preparatory career
path coupled with the stringent qualification and screening
procedures do not preclude yearly detachments - for- cause of
commanding officers suggests that requirements could be more
stringent. Command opportunity has ranged between 45
percent and 55 percent for several years. Reducing this
opportunity significantly (by about half to 25 percent for
example) would destroy the traditional unwritten law that to
promote to Captain requires previous command at sea experi-
ence. This decreased opportunity would be caused by
increasing the command tour length, doubling it in the
example given. The impacts of halving command opportunity
would be these:
1 . General Impact
a) It reduces the opportunity for SWOs to reach the
stated community goal of "Command at Sea."
b) The need for all to "ticket punch" a command at
sea billet would be alleviated.
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c) Increased assignment emphasis would be placed on
subspecialty skills.
d) With a 60 percent selection opportunity to Captain
and only a 25 percent command opportunity, selec-
tion boards would have to reconsider their
criteria for selection and this should open the
way for those "best fitted" and truly outstanding
subspecialists to be selected.
e) It could negatively affect retention for both
screeners and non- screeners
:
i) for screeners because it would mean more family
separation time for the longer duty at sea.
ii) for non- screeners because of the current
stigma of not being command screened.
f) It could positively affect retention for both
groups as screeners perceive their increased value
to the Navy and non- screeners realize decreased
family separation and the opportunity of further
development of a specific subspecialty area in
which they could gain the reputation of being
acknowledged experts.
g) It could be a disincentive to junior officers to
remain in the Navy or enter the SWO community,
since command at sea has always been the hallmark
of the Surface Warfare community.
Command Impact
a) Tour lengths for those in command would double to
approximately four years providing leadership and
policy making continuity. The implication here is
that long range planning and material readiness
would receive more emphasis as commanding officers
would have more control over both and perceive
more accountability for the "health" of the ship.
The result could be that the fleet's battle readi-
ness would improve.
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b) Instead of increasing tour lengths, sequential CO
tours in another ship either right away or
following a professionally expanding War College
tour could be effected. This could increase the
number of PCS moves but would reduce the continued
stress of command and permit sharing of command
knowledge at the War College and use of that
knowledge during the follow-on CO tour.
c) Would reduce opportunity for those officers
command screened to gain valuable professional
experience both at sea in other important billets
and ashore (Battle Group Staffs, OPNAV , etc.).
Non- command Impact
a) A number of officers who previously had records
good enough to screen for command, would be
assigned to other at sea billets demanding experi-
ence and expertise.
b) It would provide improved subspecialty utilization
during the time an officer would have spent at sea
as CO.
c) For those officers not screened, longer tour
lengths would be the norm as the need to get back
to sea for a command tour would no longer apply.
Post- command Impact
a) The supply of post command officers would drop by
one half and the availability of them for
follow-on tours would occur two years later than
before due to the longer CO tour. This could
effectively make post- command commanders a scarcer
quantity than is now the case at a time when
requirements for them are increasing.
b) It would reduce opportunity for post command offi-
cers to feedback their experience to others (those
billets currently identified as requiring post
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command officers would have to be filled by other
officers )
.
c) It would decrease major command selectivity which
currently stands at approximately 50 percent.
d) It would mean that a very high proportion of post-
command officers would go back to sea for a two
year major command tour and some also for an 18
month sequential command tour. This could mean
seven and a half years of sea duty in a period of
less than ten years.
The PCS implications of this are that less opportunity
for command means longer command tours for a given number of
ships, which in turn permits longer tours elsewhere. Both
of these increase personnel stability, unit or staff cohe-
siveness and reduce officer PCS moves and costs.
B. AN ACROSS-THE-BOARD OP/ROT MOVE CATEGORY EXTENSION
The immediate impact of a change in tour length is
deceptive; an example will illustrate this. Assume that all
operational (OPS) and rotational (ROT) tours in the SWO
community were 24 months long for a tour cycle of eight
quarters. Now assume that on a certain date all of these
tours were to be extended by six months, the new tour rota-
tion cycle would now be ten vice eight quarters long. The
impact would be no moves in the first six months and there-
after twenty percent fewer moves annually. This is illus-
trated in the following equation:
1 -(old tour length/new tour length) = 1 - 24/30
= .2
= 20 percent
The conclusion reached is that the number of moves and the
associated costs would be cut by half the first year and 20
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percent every year thereafter. However, this is not the
case
.
While savings the first year are 50 percent, the second
year no savings would be realized, because the same numbers
of personnel would be rotated per tour rotation cycle as
before. The change is that the cycle is now ten quarters
vice eight. While the savings in a completely steady state
system will be 20 percent over time, the savings realized
will actually be 100 percent for the first two quarters and
no savings for the next eight quarters before the cycle
repeats itself.
C. VALIDATING THE INDIVIDUALS ACCOUNT
The individuals account, comprising students, trainees,
midshipmen and the TPS&D (Transients, Patients, Separations
and Disciplinary) Account, do not directly figure into the
PCS equation but the allowed size of it and the actual
numbers of officers in it impact on officer career paths.
When billet requirements and community inventories are
compared everyone is assumed to be in a billet. If this is
the case then the billet inventory will match the officer
inventory. Although it is possible for a grade mismatch to
still exist, the chances are less and the people can be
detailed to fill all billets. If, however, excess people
are in the individuals account, for example due to extra
training requirements, then a supposedly fully manned commu-
nity has, in effect, lost those excess people who are under-
going valid, required training. Therefore a number of
authorized billets equal to the number of excess officers in
the individuals account are vacant . A required increased
attendance at the War College by post-command officers is a
good example of this. Another example of this is the
increased specialty training for SWOs . In particular the
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LCDR and CDR grades have oversubscribed individuals
accounts. The 1979 URL Study offered the following
explanation:
An example of an uncompensated requirement is to be
found in the CDR grade where many officers enroute to
command steam ships now have a PCO training pipeline six
months long due to the addition of the senior officer
ship material readiness course. 10 percent or more of
our officers are transients or trainees in some' grades
where 6 percent is allowed.
While the CNO-directed reduction in enroute training
implemented in 1982 reduced the numbers of officers in the
individuals account, differences still exist. This
disparity between "billets and bodies" masking the communi-
ty's usable personnel inventory is one of the factors
creating shortages.
The overall shortage in the Surface Warfare Community
has serious implications. Because there are fewer officers
than required, SWOs spend a larger portion of their time at
sea, as sea billets necessarily have the highest priority.
As a greater percentage of time is spent at sea, education
and experience gained ashore suffer. Postgraduate education
and its application during subsequent subspecialty tours is
underutilized since insufficient time is available for shore
duty. The equally high priority shore jobs such as
recruiting and Naval Academy /NROTC/OCS/ SWOS instructors will
also compete for fewer available officers.
D. ALTERNATIVE CAREER PATHS
A key objective of this study was to recommend modifica-
tion of the career path to decrease the frequency of moves
or increase the efficiency of officer movements, if deemed
necessary. In Chapter IV current career paths have been
depicted with seven groups of pathways which aid
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significantly in looking at the number and progression of
tours and, therefore, the number of possible moves in the
first twenty plus years of a career.
Reflecting back to the discussion in Chapters III and IV
about career paths and the interrelationships of tour
length, selectivity and opportunity, several points require
reiteration:
1. The SWO career path is essentially an alternating
progression from sea to shore duty and back for the
primary purpose of career development with retention
a prime consideration.
2. Successive tours in a career path should be linked
together for overall career development purposes and
to plan for geographic location changes. The
geographical billet analysis brought forth quite
clearly that most officers cannot fulfill their
professional development requirements and meet the
needs of the Navy by remaining in the same geograph-
ical location. Understanding this, a possible avenue
to pursue is for the assignment branch to consider
the availability of a follow-on assignment in the
same location while the prior assignment is being
considered. This linking together of subsequent
tours in the career pathway can be both cost-
effective and meet individual and Navy needs
.
3. For this same reason the use of subspecialty utiliza-
tion should be given more attention during sea duty
tours. An officer who has received an education
should apply that during operational tours. One
example is that of an ASW coded officer. Application
of his expertise is best served aboard a unit or
staff with ASW capabilities and responsibilities.
Similarly, though few coded billets at sea exist, the
computer systems trained individual would be better
utilized on a NTDS ship or staff than elsewhere.
98
1. Early Department Head School Career Path
The early department head school career path is one
of the recommendations that has been proposed to solve many
of the difficulties facing the SWO community. LCDRs are
currently serving in LT billets on the second half of their
department head split tours and occasionally during the
first half. According to the SWO community manager, in FY
1984 197 LCDRs were "down-detailed" to fill these LT
billets. This "down-detailing" of officers to billets
junior to their rank causes these officers to be unavailable
to fill existing LCDR billets. This perpetuates the mid-
grade officer shortfall.
The path begins as displayed in Figure 7.1 with
completion of the SWO (Basic) course (Tour OA) and the
current standard thirty month division officer tour (Tour
IE). At this career point, with three to three and one half
years of commissioned service, the officer attends
Department Head School (Tour 2A) and when finished proceeds
to his initial department head tour (Tour 3E) for the stan-
dard eighteen months
.
However, at this juncture two career path options
are available. The first is to have the officer undertake
his second department head tour (Tour 4E or 4F) completing
it at about the seven and a half years of commissioned
service point, while still a LT . The major benefit of this
option is that the officer would be available to fill LCDR
billets the entire time he is of "that rank. Postgraduate
School (Tour 5B) would then follow the department head tours
(Tours 3E and 4E or 4F). The officer would do an immediate
payback tour (Tour 6C or 6D) and best utilize and reinforce
his newly gained knowledge. Following this the LCDR sea
tour (Tour 7E or 7F) would be next. The next node (Tour 8E)
represents the career path point where the two options































second payback tour (Tour 9C or 9D) follows and after that,
this pathway group is exactly like the Major Command Pathway
discussed in Chapter IV.
In the second option the officer goes directly to
Postgraduate School (Tour 4B ) and on completion returns to
his second department head tour (Tour 5E or 5F). The next
tour is the LCDR sea tour (Tour 6E or 6F) and is followed by
a payback or subspecialty utilization tour (Tour 7C or 7D)
.
As discussed above the two options rejoin in the eighth tour
with the XO assignment (Tour 8E). The benefits of attending
PG school at this career point, during the fourth tour, are:
1. After four years of sea duty in four and a half years
it provides a retention-motivated break from sea
duty.
2. With attendance at Postgraduate School the officer
incurs at least three and one half years additional
obligated service at just about the same time both
his initial obligation and his two year department
head obligation are expiring. This Postgraduate
School obligation will not expire until roughly the
eight plus year point.
3. Hard- charging officers are rewarded earlier with the
challenge and responsibility of a department head
tour. These officers could be told they will be
ordered to Department Head School if a seat becomes
available. Then, if the detailers have someone
cancel a quota this more junior officer could be
ordered into the vacant slot. Although short prior
notification might be undesirable, many officers may
view this (being one of the few of their YG chosen)
to be a positive motivator. This process would help
assure that every seat in Department Head School is
filled, thus paying dividends down the road in making
sure those in their department head tours are
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relieved on time and then become available as LCDR
personnel assets.
This alternative is attractive because it can
utilize to great advantage the need for at least 20 percent
of the department heads to shift homeports between tours.
Starting Department Head School early, going to Postgraduate
School early and linking the next two sea tours (Tours 5E or
5F with 6E or 6F) have the potential to save one PCS move
and thus PCS funds
.
2 . Technical Subspecialty Career Pathway
The rapidly increasing need for technical subspe-
cialists in the Navy necessitates a look at how to utilize
them and the education they received better than is
currently done. The technical subspecialty career pathway
is an answer to this problem. This pathway will provide
early postgraduate technical education and then continue to
use this education both afloat and ashore to build on
previous experience. The end product will be an officer who
is operationally current and has through repeated utiliza-
tion of his subspecialty area evolved as a "blue-suit"
consummate expert in his field by the time he reaches the
grade of captain. This expertise may then be applied in the
Weapons Systems Acquisition Management (WSAM) area as a
program manager or in a host of other jobs requiring this
technical experience both at sea and ashore.
This pathway begins with a thirty month division
officer tour (Tour IE), Postgraduate School (Tour 2B),
Department Head School (Tour 3A) and the initial department
head tour (Tour 4E) as shown in Figure 7.2.
At this point the pathway begins to differ from
those developed in Chapter IV. Tours 4E , 5C/5D and 6E are















































opportunity for this officer to apply his postgraduate
knowledge to real world shipboard use during a fifty percent
longer, twenty-seven month initial department head tour.
This experience is then employed ashore, still in the same
subspecialty area (Tour 5C or 5D) . The purpose of this tour
(Tour 5C or 5D) is to share this experience with those
ashore and learn from them, continuing to build area exper-
tise. It is envisioned that this thirty-six month long tour
would permit an officer to fully learn his job in his first
year and then serve in that capacity for more than two full
years, thus providing a continuity of technical "blue suit"
corporate knowledge not possible in a two year tour.
Another twenty-seven month sea tour (Tour 6E) follows shore
duty (Tour 5C or 5D) . This job would be drawn from either
the second half department head list or the LCDR sea tour
list and would call upon this officer's collective talents.
Examples of the progression of the three tours just
discussed might include FF-1052 class frigate Engineer
Officer to the Naval Sea Systems Command to Main Propulsion
Assistant on an aircraft carrier. For an antisubmarine
warfare specialist these three tours might progress from
Combat Systems Officer on a DD-963 class destroyer to the
ASW Systems Project Office to Combat Systems Officer on a
CG-26 class cruiser. For a communications engineering
expert it may begin as a Ship's Control Officer on an FFG-7
class guided missile frigate, progress to a job at the Naval
Electronics Systems Command and return to sea as assistant
communications officer on a fleet commander's staff. For
the Command, Control and Communications (C 3 ) expert it may
begin as an Operations Officer on a frigate, move to a C 3
job in OPNAV and then return to sea as Operations Officer on
a guided missile cruiser. The purpose here is to tie these
three tours together so that when an officer completes Tour
6E he has been working or studying in his subspecialty area
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for a minimum of ten years in the first thirteen years of
his career (this includes at least one year as a division
officer)
.
The follow-on tour is the standard eighteen month XO
tour (Tour 7E). This utilizes his experience at sea and
offers the officer a broader perspective than gained while
building his departmental background. A second subspecialty
utilization tour (Tour 8C/8D) occurs at this point further
strengthening his area expertise. Command (Tour 9E) and a
third payback tour (Tour IOC or 10D),and possibly the senior
course at the Naval War College (Tour 10B) occur next and
lead to the eleventh tour, that of program management (Tour
11C or HD), major command at sea (Tour HE), or ashore
tours (Tour lie or 11D) . These last three are captain
billets requiring tremendous managerial skills, leadership
ability, and technical knowledge and experience.
This is the true strength of the technical subspe-
cialty career pathway. By recurring subspecialty utiliza-
tion at sea and ashore both the ship or staff served and the
supporting shore establishment have been the beneficiaries
of the officer's information exchange. Although not all
technical subspecialty areas have similarly applicable sea
billets, many do and this pathway is applicable to them.
It should also be noted that in this pathway the CO
tour (Tour 9E) is served during the ninth tour. Lengthening
the fourth, fifth and sixth tours deleted a tour. The net
result is that the career path is more efficient for the
reasons discussed and because of the increased continuity
possible with the longer tours. Additionally, the deletion
of one tour means one less PCS move for every officer in
this pathway.
These alternative avenues represent ways in which
the SWO community may continue to develop its officers
professionally as PCS constraints become more severe. These
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VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This study has examined the Surface Warfare Officer
career path to assess the feasibility of extending tour
lengths and the impact this will have on professional devel-
opment. A framework for assessing the relationship between
PCS moves and SWO career paths has been initiated through
the breakdown of the career paths into seven groups of
career pathways using network representation. Also included
in this study are a geographic breakdown of the billets SWOs
are required to fill and a historical analysis of SWO tour
lengths
.
A. TOUR LENGTH INTERRELATIONSHIPS
The closed personnel system in which the Navy operates
requires that alternative policies consider the effect that
an action on one portion of the SWO community will have on
the rest of the community. These interrelationships are
essential to consider and account for to ensure minimum
professional development is achieved so that readiness may
be maintained and the leaders of tomorrow's Navy receive the
necessary experiences.
1. The Effect of Lengthening the Initial Sea Tour
The interrelationships between tour lengths for the
various tours may best be illustrated by an extension of the
initial sea tour length. While the actual tour lengths and
numbers in a year group would illustrate a real scenario,
the numbers employed in this example were chosen to give
round numbers and therefore easier visualization. Seven
assumptions are made at the outset:
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1. Tour progression consists of alternating sea-shore
assignments
.
2. Sea billets are manned at one hundred percent.
3. The number of initial sea tour billets is one
hundred
.
4. Retention is 46% and all separations occur at the end
of the second tour, a shore tour, which is two years
long.
5. The department head requirement is thirty billets.
Billet opportunity is one hundred percent.
6. A second two year shore tour follows the department
head tour.
7. The second shore tour is followed by an XO tour with
sixty percent billet opportunity.
Within this example, two policies will be compared.
A three year initial sea tour representing current policy
will be lengthened to four years. The impact of this policy
change on sea and shore manning, other tour lengths and
billet opportunity will be assessed. For purposes of
clarity, those serving a three year initial sea tour will be
referred to as group A personnel while those serving a four
year tour will be called group B personnel.
With a three year tour the annual accession require-
ment is 33: (100 billets)/(3 year tour) = 33 billets /year
.
When this tour length is extended to four years the annual
accession requirement drops to 25: (100 billets)/ (4 year
tour) = 25 billets/year or a drop of 24%. This 24% decrease
is significant for it means the annual accession requirement
will decrease by 8, requiring eight fewer accession moves
and saving PCS funds.
The net result of the loss of 54% of the officers at
the end of the initial shore tour is that 15 of the Group A
officers (.46 x 33) and 12 Group B officers (.46 x 25) are
still in the system. These personnel are assumed to be
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career personnel and will remain in the system for at least
twenty years
.
Since all career personnel will serve one department
head tour the tour length for group A will be two years (30
billets/15 officers per year). The tour length for group B
will be two and a half years (30 billets/12 officers per
year) . For both groups a second two year shore tour is then
served followed by an XO tour for those who screen. The
impact of billet opportunity and tour length for a given
number of billets is explained next.
With eighteen XO billets and opportunity at 60%, 9
officers (15 x .6) in group A and 7.2 officers (12 x .6) in
group B will screen for XO . This 60% opportunity will then
translate into a two year XO tour for group A (18 billets /
9 officers per year) and a two and a half year tour for
group B (18 billets / 7.2 officers per'year).
Summarizing the length of time each group has served
at the end of this XO tour: group A has served eleven years
and group B has served thirteen years . The group A officer
then serves a two year shore tour and both officers are now
at the thirteen year point. Table 27 itemizes the tour
lengths for the two groups . What conclusions can be drawn
from this example?
1. Both groups meet the same sea billet requirements.
2. At the thirteen year point the group A officer has
spent seven years at sea or 54% of his career, while
the group B officer has spent nine years at sea or
69% of his career.
3. The group A officer has two additional years of shore
duty than does the group B officer.
4. In the first thirteen years of service the group A
officer has served six tours and the group B officer
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5. If the sea-to-shore rotation was continued, the group
B officer would go to his command tour significantly
later in his career than would the group A officer.
Not yet considered but essential is an assessment of
the ability of group B personnel to man shore requirements.
The assumption is made that group A personnel manned the
shore billets with no one in excess. The initial shore tour
billets number 33 so 8 of them would be gapped per year by
the 25 group B personnel. During the second shore tour the
15 group A personnel completing their department head tour
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fill the fifteen shore billets; while with group B personnel
three billets would remain vacant since they have only 12
officers. During the XO tour the 6 group A personnel not
screening for XO would fill the six shore non-XO billets.
However, group B has only 4.8 personnel to fill these six
billets so 1.2 billets would be gapped. The post XO shore
tour is not considered in the shore billet assessment. This
is only to simplify the example by considering both groups
for the same number of years of commissioned service. The
conclusion to be drawn is that through the eleven year point
group B would have to gap approximately 28% of the shore
billets while group A could fill them all.
One last issue should be examined. If the XO tour
length was fixed at two years, how would that affect manning
and XO opportunity? Since the assumption has been made that
sea billets will be completely manned, no impact will be
felt. With a two year XO tour 9 group B officers will be
required annually, the same number as in group A. However,
the 9 XOs in group A represent 60% of the year group while
the 9 XOs in group B represent 75% of their year group. The
issue illustrated here is that for different sized year
groups to have the same tour length, the smaller year group
must have a greater billet opportunity. In actuality five
consecutive URL year groups are averaged to compute opportu-
nity to dampen out these YG size effects. While the example
sizes were based on smaller accessions for group B than for
group A, the retention for both was assumed to be the same.
In the real world if a year group has poor retention and the
same circumstances apply, requirements must still be met and
the smaller year group may have a higher opportunity.
2. The Impact of Billet Opportunity
As discussed previously, higher opportunity denotes
lower selectivity and with it, at some point, must come
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decreased readiness as quality diminishes. No quantitative
data are available to support this, yet it is generally held
to be true. This is one reason tour lengths are adjusted
over time, to ensure continued selectivity. Current XO
opportunity is 60% with an eighteen month tour. Due to the
buildup towards the 600 ship Navy, additional XO billets
could soon make XO opportunity 76% retaining the eighteen
month tour length fixed. To hold this opportunity at the
70% level and thereby keeping selectivity at a high level XO
tour lengths would have to increase to twenty months.
B. CONCLUSIONS
This study has conducted a critical review of billet and
professional development requirements in the Surface Warfare
Community to optimize the use of increasingly scarce
Permanent Change of Station Funds. The two assumptions
that :
1. PCS costs can be reduced by altering officer career
paths to decrease the frequency of moves and
2. that career paths are driven primarily by
professional development requirements
have been examined. The first has been shown to be true
while in the second, move frequency and career paths were
found to be driven by billet requirements as well. It
should be emphasized that tour length and career path modi-
fications should be made only after billet requirements have
been considered.
Current Surface Warfare officer movement patterns have
been aggregated into seven career pathways using a network
representation. Within this framework it is possible to
assess alternative career paths both in tour progression and
tour length. Essential to the development of these pathways
was the identification of the four focal points of
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professional development: the major command tour, the
commander command tour, the executive officer tour and the
department head tour.
A historical analysis of SWO tour lengths was conducted
for the previous fifteen years and also the most recent five
year period. The data generally supports the current SWO
tour length policy. Two alternate career paths were devel-
oped which increase the efficiency of the SWO career path
and potentially save PCS funds.
1. The early Department Head School Career Path provides
additional early responsibility, increases retention
and optimizes the moves of those officers who need to
shift homeports between their department head tours.
This optimization occurs through the consideration of
several successive tours and attempting to link these
tours together to remain in the same geographical
area whenever possible.
2. The Technical Subspecialty Career Path saves PCS
funds, provides for near maximum utilization of area
technical expertise both at sea and ashore and
develops an officer who is a "blue suit" consummate
subject matter expert prior to selection to captain.
This is accomplished while maintaining the officer
operationally current.
This study represents a first attempt at laying the
groundwork to build a comprehensive PCS planning model. A
method of computing the number of billets SWOs are required
to fill in various geographic areas has been developed. An
analysis of these required SWO billet numbers by geograph-
ical location confirmed that SWOs cannot remain in the same
homeport for both sea and shore tours due to the numbers of
billets SWOs must fill in non-Fleet Concentration Areas.
The following two recommendations require more research.
It is felt that their development and implementation would
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be of considerable value to both the Officer Professional
development system and also the PCS accounting branch:
1. expand on this study and develop a comprehensive PCS
assessment model that would consider detailed alter-
native professional development issues necessary to
maintain the readiness of the SWO community.
2. identify the quality and quantity of experiences
necessary to effectively operate ashore as a captain.





ACCOMPANIED OVERSEAS TOUR: A tour of duty outside the
continental United States during which dependents are
authorized to and may accompany their sponsor.
BILLET: A specific military manpower space which is
assigned qualifiers that define the duties, tasks and func-
tions to be performed and the specific skills and skill
level required to perform the delineated functions. (Note:
billet connotes military requirement; position connotes
civilian requirement.)
COMMAND OPPORTUNITY: The average opportunity for any
officer to have at least one screened command in grade. It
is obtained by dividing the average number of screened
commands available per year by the average year group size.
Tour length will affect command opportunity.
CONTINUATION: A measure of all community entries and exits.
DETAIL: To assign an officer to a billet.
DUTY UNDER INSTRUCTION (DUINS): An assignment to duty under
instruction at a course or courses in which the cumulative
duration is 20 weeks or more.
INDIVIDUALS: A Defense Programming and Planning category of
manpower which includes military personnel who are not
considered force structure manpower and consist generally of
transients, patients, prisoners, holdees, students,
trainees, and midshipmen.
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MANDATORY MOVES: Accession, Separation, and Organized Unit
moves
.
MPN: Appropriations for "Military Personnel, Navy" which
fund PCS travel. Detailer budgets are MPN funds.
NAVY OFFICER BILLET CLASSIFICATION (NOBC): A 4-digit code
representing the functional description requirements of
officer billets. An element of the code structure within
the Navy officer classification system which is used to
identify the officer billet requirements and the officer
occupational qualifications acquired through billet
experience
.
O&MN : Appropriations for "Operations and Maintenance, Navy"
which includes funds for per diem associated with TEMDUINS
performed on PCS orders - training less than 20 weeks
(TEMDUINS/TEMDIFINSOPS) . Placement Officer budgets are O&MN
funds
OFFICER MANNING PLAN (OMP): The policy instrument by which
Navy establishes manning priorities and "fair shares" inven-
tory available to the force structure. The plan was devel-
oped to manage the shortage of URL Lieutenants through
Commander
.
PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION (PCS): The transfer or assign-
ment of a member or unit from one permanent station to
another (for duty of more than 6 months or under instruction
of 20 weeks or more). This includes the change from home,
or from the place from which ordered to active duty, to
first station upon appointment, call to active duty, enlist-
ment, or induction; and from last duty station to home, or
to the place from which he/she entered the Military Service,
placement upon the temporary disability retired list,
release from active duty, or retirement. It also includes a
116
duly authorized change in home port of a vessel or mobile
unit
.
POSTGRADUATE EDUCATION: A course of study beyond the bacca-
laureate level which may or may not lead to the awarding of
an advanced degree.
PRESCRIBED TOUR LENGTH: The standard period of time
established for tours in specific locations.
PROJECT MANAGER: The individual within the Naval Material
Command, bureaus, and offices responsible, within well-
defined boundaries of time, resources, and performance
requirements, for executing an approved project.
PROJECTED ROTATION DATE (PRD): Planned date of detachment
from present duty station.
PROVEN SUBSPECIALIST: A URL LCDR, CDR, or CAPT selected by
board action as having special value in a subspecialty
community by virtue of range and depth of subspecialty
experience and proven superior performance.
PROVEN SUBSPECIALIST: An unrestricted line officer in the
grade of LCDR through CAPT who has been identified by a
Subspecialty Selection Board as an experienced specialist
and selected as "proven" based on the officer's demonstrated
superior performance. Billets requiring and officers poss-
essing a proven subspecialty code are designated by the
following suffixes: C, proven at PhD level; M, proven at
engineer's level; Q, proven at master's level; F, proven at
functional education level; and, R, proven at significant
experience level.




RETOUR: Subsequent assignment in the same geographic
location.
SUBSPECIALIST: An officer who has one or more
subspecialties
.
SUBSPECIALTY: A technical or managerial field of interest
which requires specialized professional skills or knowledge
(obtained through various combinations of pertinent educa-
tion, training, and/or experience) in support of a given
mission or functional area.
SUBSPECIALTY CODE: An alphanumeric code used to identify
officers and billets representing education and/or experi-
ence in a subspecialty. Detailed codes are contained in the
Manual of Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel
Classifications (NAVPERS 15839 series).
TRANSIENTS, PATIENTS, SEPARATIONS & DISCIPLINARY (TPS&D)
:
That portion of total military manpower which is nonavai-
lable for assignment to billets afloat or ashore for reasons
other than training. Transients represent that average
strength involved in Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves
between duty assignments. Patients and disciplinary
strength represent that average strength which is nonavai-
lable for reasons of medical or disciplinary causes.
Separations strength reflects the average total of officer
and enlisted personnel awaiting final separation from active
duty. Together with students, trainees, and midshipmen, the
TPS&D accounts comprise total Navy nonavailable strength as
reflected in the Defense Planning and Programming Category
(DPPC) entitled "Individuals."
TOUR OF DUTY: Military duty performed while assigned to a
military installation or activity permanently located at a
land station either inside the continental limits of the
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United States (CONUS) or outside the continental limits
(Overseas )
.
UNRESTRICTED LINE (URL): Officers of the line of the
Regular Navy and Naval Reserve who are not restricted in the
performance of duty.
WARFARE SPECIALIST: Within the unrestricted Line, an
officer designated 111X (Surface Warfare), 112X (Submarine
Warfare), 113X (Special Warfare), 114X (Special Operations),





DEPARTMENT HEAD SPLIT TOUR BILLETS
First Tour Second Tour
Ship Department Ship Department
DD-945 OPS/WEPS DD-945 ENG
DD-963 CS/ENG DD-963 OPS
DDG--2 WEPS DDG-2 OPS/ENG
DDG-993 ENG DDG-37 OPS/ENG/CS
FFG--1 OPS/ENG/WEPS DDG-993 OPS/CS
FFG--7 SCO/CS/ENG FF-1037 XO
ff-:L037 OPS/ENG/WEPS CG-16 OPS/ENG/CS
ff-:L040 OPS/ENG/WEPS CG-26 OPS/ENG/CS
ff-:L052 OPS/ENG/WEPS CG-47 OPS/ENG
CG-47 WEP CONT CGN OPS/CS
MSO XO LHA 1ST/CS
MCM XO LKA 1ST
LHA DCA LPH 1ST/ENG
LKA OPS/ENG LSD 1ST
LSD OPS/ENG LPD OPS/ENG/ 1ST
AGF OPS AGF 1ST/ENG
LST OPS/ENG LST 1ST
AO OPS/ENG AOE ENG/ 1ST
AOE OPS AOR OPS/ENG/1ST
AE OPS AE ENG/ 1ST
AFS OPS/ENG AFS 1ST












CATEGORIES OF PCS ENTITLEMENTS
1. Mileage for privately- owned vehicle (POV)
.
2. Transportation by common carrier (rail, bus, air,
or water, including Military Airlift Command
(MAC) and Military Sealift Command (MSC)).
3. Per diem allowance.
4. Actual and necessary expenses and cost of subsis-
tence while in a travel status.
5. Issue of meal tickets in lieu of subsistence.
6. Travel of dependents and transportation of
baggage and household goods.
7. Port handling charges for personnel, their house-
hold goods, baggage, and privately owned automo-
biles passing through CONUS Military Traffic
Management Command (MTMC) terminals.
8. Payment of dislocation allowances.
9. Authorized transportation of dependents and
personal and household effects of deceased
military personnel.
10. Costs of contract packing, crating, handling, and
.
temporary storage of household goods.
11. Cost of non- temporary storage of household goods.
12. Cost of trailer allowances.
13. Travel incident to organizational movements.
14. Expenses incident to PCS movement of any military
group traveling under one set of orders from the
same point of origin to the same destination.
15. Minor supplies and services incident to
organizational PCS movements, expenses,
allowances incident to separation, discharge,
or release.
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16. Authorized temporary duty travel directly related
to and an integral part of PCS movements.
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APPENDIX D
SWO COMMUNITY OBJECTIVES IN REVISED CAREER PATH
Long Term :
- Increase readiness and warfighting capability of force
- Balanced distribution of high quality officers among
major departments
Mid-Term :
- Intensify officer professional development in Operations,
Combat Systems, Engineering and overall material
readiness
-- Develop experience through continuity of assignment to
departments
- Maximize mid-grade technical expertise available to
commanding officers
- Align afloat career paths with postgraduate education and
shore assignments
- Increase PCO course emphasis on tactics and warfighting
Short Term :
- Provide broad base of experience to division officers
and increased experience in a discipline to department
heads
- Increase training prior to key billet assignments
-- Improve coordination between detailer and command
in monitoring qualification process
-- Assign additional officer to ships to offset impact of
increased off-ship training
- Develop department head progression from less to more
complex assignments
- Educate all levels of Surface Warfare community regarding
criticality of total support and acceptance of concept
in order to achieve required improvements
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APPENDIX E
ANALYSIS OF SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER BILLETS LOCATIONS
The tables on the following nineteen pages provide a
detailed breakdown of the geographical location of billets
in which SWOs are required to serve. The tables for the
nine Non-Fleet Concentration Areas are shown first. They
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